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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Children, as well as adults, are continually asked to explain the
behaviors of other people.

However, it cannot be assumed that the

processes by which adults and children interpret behavioral information
are the same.

The present study was designed to gain greater under-

standing of these differences in the processing or assessment of behavioral information.
The specific purposes of the present study are twofold.

First, the

differential use of behavioral information in inferring dispositions by
individuals operating at different cognitive levels was examined.

That

is, it was determined whether individuals at different cognitive levels
use behavioral information in the same manner to make attributions of
personality characteristics.

Secondly, this research determined whether

individuals at different levels of cognitive development used the past
behaviors of an actor in deciding whether or not that actor was responsible for, and intended to produce, the actions in question.

For

example, subjects initially told that an actor performed three actions
were asked whether or not they believed that the actor performed a
subsequent action which was ambiguous with respect to the identity of
the performer.

If a subject believed that the actor did perform that

action, he or she was questioned on whether the action was performed
intentionally or unintentionally.
Both the attributions of dispositions and the explanations of
responsibility and intentionality may be considered parallel processes
1
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to person perception.

Specifically, information must first be assessed

to determine the degree to which it is reflective of the person's intentions.

Past research appears inadequate in answering these issues be-

cause of different variations in the information presented.

That is,

some studies make conclusions based upon more than behavioral information; and other·studies present a severely limited amount of information.
The present paper reviews these problems and proposes a new approach in
researching these questions.

Employing the attributional model of

Kelley (1967), it is hypothesized that limitations imposed by earlier
stages of cognitive development will influence an observer's assessment
of behavioral information.

More specifically, it is expected that chil-

dren functioning at a preoperational level (2-7 years) of cognitive development will not have learned to expect invariances or inconsistencies
in an individual's behaviors.

The consistency or inconsistency within a

"set" of behavioral information will, therefore, not be a factor in the
formation of the child's impressions of others.

This may influence the

child's capacity to infer the intentions underlying behaviors, consequently affecting both attributions of dispositions and interpretations
of responsibility and intentionality underlying subsequent ambiguous
actions.

In contrast, individuals cognitively operating on concrete

(7-12 years) and formal (over 12 years) levels will have learned to expect
invariances in the behaviors of others.

Thus, the consistency or incon-

sistency of.the "set" of behavioral information will differentially
affect the interpretations of intentions and subsequent dispositional
attributions and explanations of responsibility and intentionality underlying ambiguous actions.
Piaget's perspective of the child's moral judgments

3

With the publication of Piaget's (1932) work, The moral development of the child, impetus was given to the experimental examination of
the process of moral judgments regarding transgressions.

More recently,

theorists (e.g., Johnson, 1962; Kohlberg, 1963; Lee, 1968) have supported
Piaget's central assertion that moral judgments evolve from the child's
changing levels of cognitive operation.

That is, through interaction

processes between an individual and his environment, the child acquires
those cognitive structures that determine, for a given developmental
phase, moral judgments of transgressions or behaviors that are socially
undesirable.

Three phases of cognitive development are of special

importance to these judgments.
The first phase is the "preoperational," which occurs approximately
between the ages of two and seven years.

The pervasive characteristic

of this phase is that of "egocentrism," which means the child's thoughts
are centered on his own point of view, and thus the child is unable to
conceive of the world from other people's perspectives.

Gradually the

child relinquishes this egocentric perspective and begins to realize
that his perceptions of a situation may be different from reality.

This

is the phase of "concrete operations" which emerges during the seventh
year and terminates during the ages of approximately eleven or twelve.
During the succeeding "formal operations" phase, the child can consider
possible events in addition to actual ones.

He is able not only to

think of actual relations, but also becomes capable of viewing events
and relationships that might occur.
Piaget asserts that preoperational children base their moral judgments on the obj e.:..-ivc= c...,;1sequences of . . ~ _.1sgressions, as opposed to
concrete children who examine the intentions of the transgressor.

For
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example, Hebble (1971), using Piaget's story technique, varied both the
consequences of an act and the behavioral intentions of the actor.

The

hypotheses were confirmed that the children operating at the preoperational level based their judgments primarily on the consequences of the
act and largely ignored the intentions of the transgressor.

Children

operating at the concrete level rated the actor as less "naughty" than
did the preoperational children when the intentions were good, regardless of the consequences of the act.

Hebble concluded that children -

operating at the concrete level have the ability to assess intentionality when making moral judgments.

Children operating at the preoper-

ational level, however, have not developed this capacity.!
A "Piagetian" perspective might ·explain this inability of preoperational children to take account of an actor's intentions, as resulting
from the child's highly centered logic.

The child can only attend to

one aspect or dimension· of a situation at one time.

In the same manner

that preoperational children cannot simultaneously focus on both height
and width in order to conserve volume, they cannot "decenter" away from
the objective consequences of an action to permit assessment of the
actor's intentions.
Other theorists' perspectives of the child's moral judgments
There appears to be little in Piaget's theory of cognition that
would seem to require that children focus on the consequences, as
opposed to the intentions, in making moral judgments if the intentions
of an actor and the consequences of his or her actions are clearly made
salient.

Thus, Piaget's perspective has been challenged by other re-

searchers on grounds that the supporting experimental result may be an

5

artifact of the mode of stimulus presentation or a product of particular
socialization techniques.
Chandler, Greenspan, and Batenboim (1973) reported comparison of
films and story media that suggest that preoperational children, having
viewed films, can use subjective factors (i.e., intentions) in making
moral judgments.

However, other children of the same age continue to use

objective consequences when the incidents are verbally presented as
stories.

The authors' interpretation was that the verbally presented

stimulus materials inadvertently highlighted the perceptual saliency of
the consequences of an action for the preoperational children they studied.
A medium in which the intentions and consequences are presented as more
balanced might permit children to display their awareness of and competence in assessing intentionality.
Research by Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, and Farnil (1973) has similarly
found that children operating at a preoperational level can take account
of an actor's intentions if the behavioral consequences of the actions
are positive or beneficial to others.

The authors explained these re-

sults as a product of the child's socialization processes.

Adult models

may be responding more to the behaviors than to the intentions of the
child when the consequences of the child's actions are undesirable or
negatively valued.

That is, most children may receive negative feedback,

either directly or indirectly, from socializing agents when they produce
negative outcomes regardless of their intentions.

As an example, when

a child breaks a window a parent may admonish the child whether the
action was accidental or purposeful.

However, if a child's actions are

positive or beneficial t.:.. others, the parent :,.., .ess likely to reward
these actions if they were performed accidentally rather than intention-

6

ally.

Children may then learn to discriminate intentionality more slowly

for negative actions than positive events.

According to Constanzo et al.,

this results in a developmental lag in social attribution behavior for
the two kinds of circumstances.
Both of these studies (i.e., Chandler et al., and Costanzo et al.)
seem to indicate that children operating at a preoperational level of
cognitive development can recognize the importance of intentions to
moral judgments in some situations.

Situations that do not artifically

enhance the salience of the behavioral consequences, or those situations
that reduce the salience of parental sanctions may facilitate the perceptions of intentionality and subsequent moral judgments.
The child's ability to make inferences about intentions
The question of whether children are able to perceive intentions
and use this information in making moral judgments is important, for it
may be a crucial aspect of the ability to infer personal dispositions.
That is, an actor's behaviors are usually not interpreted as indicative
of some underlying dispositional trait unless the actions are perceived
as voluntary.

Involuntary or accidental behaviors communicate little to

observers about actors' dispositions (Shaver, 1975).

Thus, ·in the same

way an observer takes account of intentionality before making moral
judgments concerning transgressions, the observer must also consider
intentionality before making inferences about an actor's dispositions.
For example, if John strikes all of his friends, the extent to which we
can say that John is "angry" or "bad" is largely determined by whether
we have seen those transgressions as intentional.

Further, the dispo-

sitions inferred are only useful in explaining subsequent behaviors that
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are ambiguous with respect to intentionality if the.dispositions have
been based on behaviors that have been intentionally enacted.

If John

has broken some dishes, the degree to which we can explain this action
as "purposeful" or "accidental" is dependent upon the interpretation
of the prior behavioral information. 2
This last point is of methodological interest since past studies
examining children's moral judgments have typically provided behavioral
information directly reflective of the intentions underlying the very
act the child is asked to judge.

It is not actually kriown if young

children can explain ambiguous behaviors.

That is, it is not known

whether they can interpret the intentions underlying an ambiguous action
as either "accidental" or "purposeful."

Further, if children can "ex-

plain" these behaviors, it is unclear what information enables them to
do so.

In other wards, previous research seems to indicate a link

between knowledge of intentions and subsequent moral judgments.

It is

yet to be determined how the characteristics of the information, reflective of the underlying intentions of an actor, affect subsequent explanations of intentionality underlying ambiguous behaviors.

Further, past

research focusing on moral judgments has typically provided stories
that describe only one behavior that was intentionally or accidentally
produced.

More information reflective of the intentions may make the

intentions of the actor more salient, thus facilitating inferences of
dispositions and explanations of ambiguous behaviors.

For example, if

John strikes other people on a number of separate occasions, it might
be easier to infer that "something" about John accounted for that behavior, than if John had only struck one person.

That is, if a behavior

only occurs once, it may have been caused by some characteristic of the
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actor or some situational element that "forced" the actor to behave in
a given way.

The more times a given behavior occurs in a variety of

situations, the more confident we become that the action was intentionally performed by the actor.

Further, it might be easier to explain

intentionality and responsibility underlying an ambiguous behavior if
more than one unit of behavioral information is presented.3

An observer's inferences of dispositions and his explanations of an
actor's ambiguous behaviors may both depend on some sampling of the
information that is available to him, both from his own present experiences and from other social sources.

Judgments of intent in these

situations may then parallel dispositional judgments.
problems of person perception.

That is, both are

Just as we can assess behavioral infor-

mation to determine an individual's traits, attitudes, and abilities, we
can also examine this information in order to infer intentions.
Person perception of children
Some researchers have already suggested an affinity between the
processes of moral judgments and those used in making inferences about
others.

Specifically, just as age and cognitive development correlate

positively with consideration of intention in the child's moral judgments, so too, with age and cognitive development, children become more
complex and more systematic in making attributions about others.

For

example, Gollins (1958) found that older children are better able to
integrate varied information about a person than younger children.

The

paradigm used involved assessment of sequentially filmed scenes depicting a child behaving in socially desirable manners followed by socially
undesirable behaviors.

Subjects were asked what they thought of the
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subject and what they had seen him do.

Responses were scored according

to whether or not they used inferences and concepts in their reports.
An "inference" was credited to the subject if he attempted to go beyond
the information presented and described some underlying motive or situation that accounted for one of the actions in the film.

Subjects were

credited with a "concept" if they attempted to relate and integrate conflicting features in the other person's behavior.

Results showed an

increase with age in the use of both "inferences" and "concepts," indicating that the ability to relate and organize information about other
people follows a developmental sequence.
Another indication of developmental changes in person perception
is provided by Livesley and Bromley (1973).

They asked subjects of

various ages to describe eight people known to them;

a man, woman, boy,

and girl they liked, and a man, woman, boy, and girl they disliked.

For

the purpose of a content analysis, the descriptions were divided into
"units."

Each unit was a statement or idea defined as one item of

information referring directly or indirectly to the other person.

Ex-

perimenters then assigned these units to one of two types of statements-central or peripheral.

Central statements included references to per-

sonal qualities and general habits.

Peripheral statements referred to

appearance, identity (e.g., age, sex, residence), social roles, possessions, details of family, and so on.

Results indicated that older

children (8-9 years) used more central statements in their descriptions
than younger children (6--7 years).

This change in strategy in impress-

ion formation between the ages of seven and eight years was interpreted
by Lives ley and Bromley as resulting from the
egocentrism.

chi::..~·~-.

::·'-~---·:;uishment

o:f

As he becomes capable of inferential thought, he integrates
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events separated in time, and finds underlying regularities, similariities, and consistencies in the other's behavior.
The implication of both these studies seems to be that as children
become older, they more readily and accurately draw inferences about
personality dispositions of others.

It is still unclear, however, how

behavioral information will be used in determining dispositions and
explaining ambiguous behaviors.

In the strictest sense, Gollin's re-

search (as well as Chandler et al.) did not completely answer this
question, since it did not deal solely with behavioral information.

The

use of films or videotapes communicates not only behavioral information
but also affective components, such as facial expressions.

Although

both behavioral and affective elements are important, since they are
salient in our everyday interactions, this confounding prevents the
determination of whether children can use behavioral information alone
in explaining intentions and determining personal dispositions.
Kelley's attribution theory
Kelley's (1967) attribution theory is relevant to these questions
since it concerns the processes by which the typical observer infers a
person's motivations from his actions.

Essentially, the theory is based

on the principle of covariation between causes and effects.

An effect

or behavior is attributed to one of the possible causes with which it
covaries over time.

To the extent that an action is observed as dis-

tinct to an individual, consistently performed by that individual over
time~

and is not being done by others in that situation, an observer can

confidently make a dispositional attribution to the actor (as opposed
to the action being a product of the stimulus or circumstance).

Kelley

11
conceptualizes this model as a three-dimensional cube in which the ob-

server is thought to arrive at his or her attributions by applying the
principle of covariation along each of the following three dimensions.
1. The "time/modality" dimension refers to the "consistency" with

which an action is performed.

Confidence in dispositional attributions

necessitates tha.t an actor's response to a· stimulus be perceived as
consistent across time and across the varying modes of interaction the
actor may have with the stimulus.

For example, we might feel more cer-

tain that it was "something about John" if John consistently strikes
Tim everytime they encounter each other, as opposed to this action being
only a one-time occurrence.
2. Kelley's "entity" dimension represents whatever object is under
attributional consideration

at the time.

When the object of perception

is another person, that person falls along this dimension.

Whether or

not a response is unique to one entity determines the "distinctiveness"
of the information.

High distinctiveness of behaviors across several

entities or actors lends support to a dispositional attribution to the
actor.

If only John hits Tim, and none of the other children do so,

this further substantiates that it must be "something about John."
3. The "persons" dimension is that from which "consensus" information is obtained.

That is, whether or not the same attributions are

made by other observers in the situation.

High consensus among observ-

ers that a personal attribution is warranted, faci1itates a dispositional attribution by any one of the observers.

If'all observers agree

that John is a "bad boy," we are further convinced that John's aggressive
actions had something to do with the way "John is," and not a prr"'""ct
of any unique stimulus or circumstance.
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To the extent that an individual's observations meet these criteria,
he or she can feel confident that a "person attribution" is warranted.
Of course, many times all of this information is not available, and we
must make tentative judgments by basing our attributions on the best
estimates we have of the unobserved dimensions.

A complement of this

situation is when we have the information available, but fail to consider it fully as a result of attributional biases.
Attributional biases of children
Kelley delineates a number of errors adults may make when attempting
to attribute an action to the situation or to the person.

Although

Kelley does not specifically state it, children may also be susceptible
to these or other attributional errors.

Further, it might be expected

that the child's cognitive level of operation may affect the probability
of making some of these errors.

It is not my intent to demonstrate that

children are making any one kind of error in their attributional processes, but to show that limitations resulting from a child's cognitive
level of operation may have a predictable impact on his or her assessment
of behavioral information.
Kelley, for example, postulates that one possible error might be the
ignoring of the relevant situation.

This suggests a tendency to attach

too much significance to the behavior and too little to the situational
context.

In terms of making attributions about dispositions, this might

indicate a difficulty in taking account of situational circumstances.
For example, John may be labeled as a "bad boy" if he strikes Tim, even
if that action was in self-defense.
This ability to consider the situation may be of particular impor-
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tance when the observer is presented with seemingly
ioral information about an actor.

~nconsistent

behav-

The capacity to make a dispositional

attribution to the actor may be dependent on resolving the perceived
inconsistencies of the actions.
children yet hits

Tim~

If John is typically kind to other

this inconsistency may be "explained" as result-

ing from Tim's provocation or. other situational factors that may have
"forced" John to take physical actions.
Of

course~

whether an inconsistent action is perceived as inconsis-

tent largely depends on whether we have learned to expect invariance in
behaviors and actions.

Much in the same way that we learn that physical

properties are invariant (e.g., that a quantity of a substance is not
altered by its shape), we may also learn that there are constant and
invariant features in human behavior and personality.

For example, if

John is a "good boy" we expect him to consistently perform good acts.
If John does strike someone, he will still be perceived as a "good boy,"
if that action results from situational circumstances.
It is not until the concrete operation phase of development that
children begin to understand this principle of "invariance."

Thus, a

series of inconsistent behaviors may not be perceived as "inconsistent"
to the child operating at the earlier preoperational phase of development.

Accordingly, the tendency to attribute an action that is incon-

sistent with the majority of actions to the situation in order to infer
"meaningful dispositions" is not present in the preoperational child.
The child operating at the preoperational level does not base his or
her impressions on the consistency of the information as a "set."

Rather,

as the information changes, so will the child's impressions of the actor.
Another possible source of attributional error Kel1eymentions stems
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from the magnitude of the affective consequences of an action.

The

"goodness" or "badness" of a behavior, independent of the intentions,
has an impact on the attributional process.

For example, Walster (1966)

presented evidence that the worse the consequences of an accidental
event, the greater is the tendency to assign responsibility to the person causing it.

Young children operating at the preoperational level

may be particularly susceptible to this error, since the inability to
decenter causes the child to focus on one isolated dimension of a situation.

The result may be a failure to employ behavioral information

relevant to a correct interpretation of any action.

That is, one that

is ambiguous with respect to whether the actor is responsible for the
action and whether the actor's performance was "purposeful" or "accidental."
Of course, it should not be assumed that both "good" and "bad"
behaviors will be equally affected by this error, for they may be seen
from qualitatively different perspectives.
Costanzo~

As previously cited,

al., have indicated that children can more easily draw in-

ferences from "good" behaviors as a result of socialization techniques
and consequent learning.

Accordingly, it is possible that children more

easily infer dispositions from the observed action when the behaviors
are positive and use this information in the determination of the responsibility for and the intentionality underlying an ambiguous act.
KelJeymentions other attributional errors, but those already
reviewed may be particularly relevant to the attributional processes of
children, since they so closely parallel the child's cognitive development.

F::::-c:;: this :---- - - • - · -_, the abili :--

' assess behavioral informa-

tion and its subsequent impact on judgments of ambiguous behaviors and
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inferred dispositions may be examined as an increasing adeptness at
making attributions.
Attributions based on variations across the "time/modality" dimension
Although the attribution process can involve the determination of
covariation along all of the three previously mentioned dimensions, each
can also be examined separately.

Furthermore, examination of variations

along only one dimension facilitates the determination of what
tional difficulties may occur for children.

attrib~

This unidimensional focus

opens any research to the criticism that the attributional processes
involving all three dimensions are qualitatively different from that of
any single dimension.

However, in many social situations information

is limited, yet we still can make attributions.

For example, Orvis,

Cunningham, and Kelley(l975) empirically found that 52% of their subjects felt they could confidently make an attribution to the circumstances
when given information about an actor that was low in consistency.

In-

formation that was perceived as high in consistency was typically
attributed to either the actor (24% of the subjects) or some interaction
between the actor and the stimulus (48% of the subjects).
In the present study, I have chosen not to present to subjects any
information pertaining to the "persons" and "entity" dimension&, but
rather I have focused exclusively on how children perceive covariations
along the "time/modalities" dimension.

That is, emphasis will be placed

on how dispositional attributions and explanations of ambiguous behaviors are made on the basis of the observation of consistencies or inconsistencies in an actor's behaviors over a series of episodes.
Consistency across modalities as it affects inferences of dispositions
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and explanations of ambiguous behaviors
To confidently make a dispositional attribution to an actor responding to stimuli necessitates that the actor's behaviors be consistent
across these stimuli.

For example, a sequence of actions in which the

actor is consistently responding to stimuli in a socially approved manner
may be sufficient information to justify a dispositional attribution of
"good boy."

A series of behaviors representing socially disapproved

responses may elicit; an attribution of "bad boy."

This behavioral irr-

formation may also be useful in interpreting actions that are ambiguous
with respect to the identity and intentions of the actor.

For example,

adults and children, who have mastered the concept of invariance, may
label an individual as not responsible for behaviors that have resulted
in physical damage, if the preceding behaviors of that actor have been
positive or socially desirable.

That is, a person who has consistently

performed "good" behaviors would not be thought to suddenly alter his
behavior by engaging in actions that result in negative consequences.
Of course, this assumes that the observer has perceived those prior
actions as intentional and not the product of unique circumstances.
Similarly, this same action that has resulted in undesirable consequences
may be labeled as "performed by the actor," if the preceding behaviors
of that actor have been negative or socially undesirable.

Further, this

action may be perceived as "intentional" or "done on purpose" if the
actor's earlier negative behaviors were seen as intentional.

In summary,

the consistently "good" or "bad" behaviors have made salient the intentions underlying an actor's behavior, making possible both dispositional
attributions and subsequent

pvnl ::>n<>H 011s

of ambigum•c behaviors.

Whether or not children operating on a preoperational level will be
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able to make dispositional attributions to the actor when given a sequence of behavioral information is unclear.

Research by Morrison and

Mancuso (1974) indicates that young preoperational children can use
behavioral information in determining whether the actor "has .it in him"
to enact future "good" or "bad" behaviors.

This might indicate that

these children have some capacity to infer dispositions.

However, a

cautious application of this interpretation should be made to our own
research, since Morrison and Mancuso employed videotapes to present tbe
actor's behaviors.

This may have made more than behavioral information

salient (e.g., information pertaining to affect, such as the actor's
facial expressions).

If Costanzo et al. are correct in their assertion

that, for preoperational children, positive behaviors are more reflective of intentions than negative actions, then it might be predicted
that these children could make dispositional attributions when the
behavioral information is positive or socially desirable.

For example,

the dispositional ratings should be more polarized toward the "good"
end of any scale than dispositions based on negative information are
polarized toward the "bad."

Further, this behavioral information may

also determine whether ambiguous actions are attributed to the actor
and, if so, the underlying intentions.

If a child observes positive

behaviors, he or she may not only perceive the actor as a "good" person
with "good" intentions, but also perceive that actor as not performing
actions that have resulted in negative consequences~

Conversely, ob-

servers may attribute responsibility to the actor if the consequences
are positive.
may

1--·~

Further, these positive consequences of-the behaviors

en as an intentional product of the actor's actions.

If

negative behaviors are observed, not only will the child have difficulty

r

f
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in inferring dispositions, but the child may also fail to attribute
responsibility and intentionality to actors of ambiguous actions.

That

is, preoperational children will not consistently attribute actions or
intentions to consistently "negative" actors when presented with ambiguous actions that have either positive or negative consequences.
Inconsistency across modalities as it affects inferences of dispositions
and explanations of ambiguous actions
Following Kel1ey'sattributional model, it might also be of thearetical interest to determine the effects of inconsistent behaviors on
dispositional attributions (e.g., two positive acts followed by a negative act).

It might be hypothesized that any inconsistency would make

dispositional attributions difficult for subjects who have learned to
expect·invariances in others' behaviors, that is, subjects who are at
the concrete and formal phases of cognitive development.

The reason for

this difficulty is that the informational "set" is low in consistency.
Thus, there may be a tendency to attribute all behaviors to situational
circumstances.

However, if the observer is "forced" to make a disposi-

tiona! attribution, he must first "explain" or "discount" the inconsistency.

One way of resolving the inconsistency may be to attribute the

least consistent behavior within the set to situational constraints or
some property of the stimulus to which the actor is responding.

For

this reason, a minimum of three behaviors must necessarily be employed
to establish .the "inconsistency" of one of the actions within the set.
For example, presenting only two behaviors, one positive the other
negative, makes attributions difficult since either behavior may be
reflective of the actor's dispositions or the unique situation.

When
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three behaviors are presented (e.g., two negative and one positive),
attributional processes are simplified.

The inconsistent behavior within

the set might be attributed to situational constraints, and the consistent information within the set might be attributed to the actor's
disposition.

At this point it should be mentioned that the ordering

of behaviors within the set may be an important. consideration.

That is,

whether the consistent or inconsistent information within a set comes
first or last in the sequence may effect attributions.

To check for

these "primacy" and "recency" effects it will then be necessary to
counterbalance the order of information within inconsistent sets.

For

example, a set consisting of two negative behaviors followed by a positive would be counterbalanced with a set consisting of a positive behavior followed by two negatives.4
Of course, it is difficult to determine whether an observer is
actually resolving the inconsistency within the information set by making situational attributions, or whether he is merely assigning it a
"weight" consistent with the impression formed from the other information.
That is, the observer may not totally disregard the piece of inconsistent information, but merely "weight" it as less indicative of the
actor's disposition than the more similar pieces of information.

In

either situation, it might be predicted that adults and children operating on a concrete level will make more evaluatively polarized (i.e.,
extreme) dispositional ratings when the information is consistent as
opposed to inconsistent.

Of course, these latter results would also be

predicted by a simple averaging model (Anderson, 1965).
pc-~.;.,_.;'1nal

That is, dis-

judgments may be predicted by the "average" value of the

behaviors on the dimension of judgment.
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Children operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development may fail to perceive inconsistent behavioral information as a "set"
when making dispositional attributions.

Accordingly, if dispositional

attributions are made, they will not necessarily be based on the information that is most consistent within the set.

Rather, dispositional

attributions will probably be based on the most temporally recent piece
of behavioral information.

This tendency is a result of the child's

inability to decenter and the consequent focusing on only one dimension
of a situation.

Affective responses being prominent in the child, this

inability to decenter results in impressions that are either strongly
negative or positive.

That is, preoperational children will make dis-

positional attributions that are highly polarized, independent of the
evaluative desirability of those behaviors preceeding the final action
of the actor.

Changes in the actor's behaviors do not lead to consid-

erations of how consistent the new behavior is with previous actions.
Instead, the child's entire impression of the actor changes because the
child's narrow focus of interest shifts. 5
Furthermore, whether any behavioral information is used in making
dispositional judgments may depend on the evaluative desirability of the
final action.

Preoperational children may have learned to perceive

positive behaviors as reflective of the intentions of the actor earlier
than negative actions.

Thus, positive information may then facilitate

dispositional attributions.

Specifically, dispositional ratings may be

more polarized when the temporally recent piece of behavioral information presented is socially desirable as opposed to undesirable.
In terms of the ability to assign

respor,.:..~v~..:....:..

... >

C:i!d

intentiom.. .c.._ ... y

to ambiguous behaviors, adults and children operating at a concrete
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l evel will pr obably base their explanation on the behavioral information
that is most consistent within the set.

For example, if John hit Tim

and then kicked Fred and then shared his lunch with Bob, it might be
easiest to discount the third action by assigning it relatively lesser
"weight" than the preceeding actions, or attributing the last behavior
to situation constraints.

As a "set" the three pieces of information

are still inconsistent, making any type of personal attributions
difficult.

But, if "forced" to determine whether an ambiguous action-

was produced by the actor and whether it was intentional or unintentional, the subject, who has learned to look for invariances in behaviors,
may more likely see the inconsistent behavior within the set as reflective of some thing other than dispositional attributes.

In the above

example, John may have shared his lunch wi th Bob because his mother told
him to do so.

Thus, John is still a "bad boy" because this action was

ex ternally motivated.

If subsequent ambiguous actions occur that have

e ither positive or negative consequences, we mi ght exp ect that John
performed the actions that had negative consequences but not those that
had positive consequences.

Intentionally produced negative consequences

are more "invariant" with prior negative actions.
Children operating at the preoperational level will probably not
pe rceive the in consistent behavioral information as a "set" of actions
r e flective o f the actor's dispositions.

Thus, the child will not

"ave ra ge" t he i n formation or try to "re solve" the inconsistencies within the set by discounting the inconsistent piece of information.

Rather,

th e child' s impressions will probably be based on the most temporally

E information.

When the latter information within a set

is positive, attributions of intentionality may more easily be made,
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facilitating dispositional judgments.

Furthermore, if the most tempor-

ally recent behavior is positive, this information may influence explanations of subsequent behaviors that are ambiguous with respect to the
identity and intentionality of the actor.

That is, if a subsequent

action has positive consequences, the preoperational child may assign
responsibility for this action·to the actor.

Specifically, it is pre-

dicted that preoperational children will be able to "decenter" from the
positive consequences of an action to consider the preceding behavioral
information.

If the preceding actions have terminated in a positive

manner, this may facilitate attributions of responsibility and intentionality to the actor.

Sets of behaviors that have terminated in

negative manners make difficult attributions of dispositions and intentions.

Thus, preoperational children may have difficulty "explaining"

subsequent ambiguous actions.

~fuen

the ambiguous actions have negative

consequences, attributions of responsibility and intentionality may be
even more difficult since the preoperational child may have trouble
"decentering" from the consequences of these actions.6
In summary, the ability to make dispositional attributions and the
ability to explain ambiguous behaviors may be viewed as parallel processes of person perception.

That is, behavioral information must be

assessed to determine whether it is reflective of the actor's intentions.
Behaviors that are consistent tend to reflect these intentions, facilitating both dispositional attributions and interpretations of subsequent
ambiguous behaviors.

In addition, variations in the consistency of this

information differentially affect individuals at various phases of cognitive development.

Individuals at the later phases (i.e.,

"c-'"'~-:-~e+-'"'"

and "formal") have learned the principle of invariance and thus are more
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likely than individuals at the earlier preoperational phases to be
attuned to the consistency or inconsistency of the "set" of behavioral
information.

These individuals may try to "explain" the inconsistency

by discounting the more "inconsistent" piece of information within that
set or by assigning it lesser "weight" than the more consistent pieces
within the set.

In contrast, individuals who have not learned to an-

ticipate invariances in behaviors will alter their impressions of an
actor as the behaviors change.

This failure of preoperational children

to consider the "set" of behavioral information results in impressions
being based on the most temporally recent piece of information.

Further,

the social desirability of the behavioral information will influence
the child's ability to infer intentions and to make dispositional attributions.

Explanations of ambiguous behaviors will, accordingly, be

based on socially desirable information, but only when the consequences
of the ambiguous actions have been positive.

This latter point stems

from the preoperational child's inability to decenter from actions that
have negative consequences.
Past research has failed to adequately investigate these hypotheses
largely because of methodologies that present more than behavioral information or show only one action of the actor.

Attribution theory in-

dicates that a series of behaviors is necessary in order for an observer
to make inferences of dispositions confidently and, by the same logic,
explanations of intentionality.

A variation in the number of behaviors

would provide a test of any effects behavioral information

has on the

formation of impressions by individuals at various levels of cognitive
de v.,~

the number of actions in a sequence or

"set" would introduce a "set size" confound (Posavac & McKillip, 1972).
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Therefore, it is necessary to hold constant the number of behaviors
presented (a minimum of three).

This will permit a manipulation of the

evaluative consistency of the behaviors within the informational set.
Variations in the consistency of the information, however, will necessitate that measures be taken to counterbalance the order of inconsistency that. may result in primacy and ·recency effects.

That is, the order

of the information within the behavioral sequence may influence the
attributional processes.

Thus, it will be necessary to reverse the

serial order of all inconsistent sequences to control for these effects.
Hypotheses and predictions
The present study is designed to investigate the following
hypotheses:
I.

Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive development will base ratings of behavioral intentionality on the
evaluative consistency of the "set" of behavioral information. 7
A.

Sets of consistently positive and negative information should
result in more polarized ratings than inconsistent sets.

B.

Consistently positive and negative sets should result in equally
polarized ratings.

II. Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development
will base ratings of behavioral intentionality on the evaluative
positivity (i.e., amount of positive information) of the behavioral
information.
A.

Consistently positive information should result in more polarized
intentionality ratings than consistently negative sets.

B.

Inconsistent sets containing two positive behaviors should result
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in more polarized ratings than sets containing only one positive behavior.
III.

Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive development will make dispositional and prediction ratings based on
"sets" of behavioral information that are either consistently
positive .o r negative across modalities.
A.

Sets of positive behavioral information should result in dispositional and prediction ratings that are evaluatively positive.

B.

Sets of negative behavioral information should result in dispositional and prediction ratings that are evaluatively negative.

C.

Both positive and negative information should result in equally
polarized dispositional and prediction ratings.

IV.

Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development will make dispositional and prediction ratings that are more
evaluatively polarized when the set of behavioral information is
consistently positive than when the information is consistently
negative.
A.

Sets of positive behavioral information should result in ratings
that are evaluatively positive.

B.

Sets of negative behavioral information should result in dispositional ratings that are evaluatively neutral.

V.

Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive development will make dispositional attributions based on the behavioral information that is most consistent within a set;

hence, when

given information that is inconsistent (i.e., both positive and
negative such as: PPN, NNP), dispositional attributions will tend
to be based on the evaluatively similar pieces of information.

8
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A.

When the most consistent information within a set is positive
(i.e., PPN, NPP) evaluatively positive ratings will be made.

B.

When the most consistent information within a set is negative
(i.e., NNP, PNN), evaluatively negative ratings will be made.

C.

These ratings, however, will be less polarized than when the
"set" of behavioral information is consistent.

VI.

Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development will base dispositional attributions on the most temporally
recent piece of behavioral information (i.e., the last behavior to
be presented), when the information presented is inconsistent.
A.

Temporally recent positive behavioral information (i.e., NNP,
NPP) will result in more positively polarized dispositional
ratings than temporally recent negative information (i.e., PPN,
PNN).

VII.

Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive development will base explanations of the responsibility for and the
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on the preceeding sets of
behavioral information that are either consistently positive or
negative.
A.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive,
positive behavioral information should result in these subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the actor.
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional.

· B.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative,
positive behavioral information should result in these subsequent ambiguous actior"'

C.

~-:-t

,._,_ ~:1 g

ascribed r" .. he actor.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive,
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negative behavioral information should result in these subsequent ambiguous actions not being ascribed to the actor.
D.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative,
negative behavioral information should result in these subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the actor.
1. These actions of the actor will be rated as intentional.

VIII. Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development will base explanations of the responsibility for and the
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on only the consistently
positive information when coupled with positive consequences of the
ambiguous event.
A.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive,
positive behavioral information should result in these subsequent ambiguous actions being .ascribed to the actor.
1. These actions of the actor will be rated as intentional.

IX.

Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive development will base explanations of the responsibility for and the
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on the preceeding behavioral
information that is most consistent within the set;

hence, when

given information that is inconsistently both negative and positive,
ratings will be based on the evaluatively similar pieces of information.
A.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive, sets
consisting of similarly positive behaviors should result in these
subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the actor.
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional.

B.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative, sets
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consisting of similarly positive behaviors should result in
these subsequent ambiguous actions not being ascribed to the
actor.
C.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive,
sets consisting of similarly negative behaviors should result
in these subsequent ambiguous actions not being ascribed to
the actor.

D.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative,
sets consisting of similarly negative behaviors should result
in these subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the
actor.
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional.

X.

Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development will base explanations of the responsibility for and the
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on the most temporally
recent piece of positive behavioral information when coupled with
positive consequences.
A.

When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive,
temporally recent positive information (i.e., NNP, NPP) should
result in these subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to
the actor.
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional.

METHOD

Subjects
Eighty-four children and adults, both male and female, from the
Chicago area served as subjects.

Twenty-eight children defined as

"preoperational" and twenty-eight defined as "concrete" by performances
on Piagetian tasks individually experienced and responded to seven stimulus conditions.

These children were attending schools in the Oak Park

Elementary School System.

Twenty-eight college students, who it was

assumed were at the "formal" operation level, also served as subjects
in these same stimulus conditions.

These college students were all en-

rolled in Introductory Psychology classes at Loyola University. 9
The children tested to determine the "preoperational" and "concrete"
levels of cognitive development were approximately six and nine years
old, respectively.

These ages were chosen because they have frequently

been associated with the preoperational and concrete phases of development.
Piagetian tasks
Prior to the presentation of the stimulus conditions, the two
younger groups of subjects were individually tested to determine the
Piagetian phase of cognitive operation they had achieved.

Because the

principle of invariance may be integral to the processes of dispositional
attributions, the tasks used were meant to determine the degree to which
the child saw his or her world as stable and permanent.

Specifically,

the tasks usea determined the degree to which conservation of a contin-
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uous quantity and conservation of a substance was maintained.

It then

is an assumption that mastery of the principle of invariance in physical
objects applies to the perception of people, (cf., Livesley & Bromley, 1973).
To determine "conservation of a continuous quantity," the child was
presented with two identical beakers equally filled with an observable
substance.

The child wa·s then asked whether or not the glasses contained

the same amount of substance.

After he .or she agreed to the equivalence

of the substances, the experimenter poured the substance from one of the
beakers into a third dissimilar container.

The child was then asked

whether the new beaker contained the same amount of substance as the
unaltered beaker.

If the subject asserted that it did, he or she was

asked to explain why.
The second task, involving the assessment of

''cons~rvation

of

substance" was performed by initially presenting the child with two
identical balls of clay.

After the child was given the chance to exam-

ine the balls, he or she was asked whether they were the same amount of
clay.

If the child did not think so, he or she was given the opportunity

to add or subtract clay from the balls so they were of equal quantity.
The experimenter then changed one of the balls to a sausage shape while
the child watched.

The child was then asked whether the ball and sausage

now contained the same amount of clay.

If the child said that they did,

he or she was again asked to explain why.
If the child performed consistently at one level across both tasks,
it was assumed that the child·was operating at that cognitive level.
That is, the child was classified as "preoperational" if he or she failed
both tasks, and "concrete" if both tasks were passed.

Tl.o

!"!?'"':'~"ses

of

the child to the stimulus manipulations . were then included in the final
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analyses as the operational definition of "level of cognitive development."
Design
All subjects individually responded to each of seven stimulus
sequences.

Six of the sequences were descriptions of behavioral "sets"

that portrayed an actor responding to a stimulus in either a consistently or inconsistently positive or negative manner (see Table 1).

The

seventh stimulus sequence consisted of a set of behaviors that were
evaluatively neutral with respect to social desirability.

That is, these

latter behaviors had previously been determined by judges to be neither
socially desirable (i.e., positive) nor socially undesirable (i.e., negative).

Following each sequence, subjects were asked to make intention-

ality and dispositional attributions to the actor.

After these attribu-

tions were made, a fourth and final behavior was presented to each subject that portrayed either positive or negative consequences ensuing from
actions that were ambiguous with respect to whether the actor had or had
not performed them and the intentions underlying the behavior.

Each

subject was subsequently asked to make attributions of responsibility and
intentionality to the actor on the basis of this information and the
preceeding behavioral sequence.

The stimulus sequences were presented

in a latin-square design to control for any effect resulting from the
order of their presentation.

In addition, the positive and negative

consequences following each sequence were alternately presented across
sequences for each subject.

Both male and female experimenters were

responsible for testing the subjects to avoid any confounds stemming
from sex of subject and sex of experimenter interactions.

32

TABLE 1
Stimulus Conditions

Behavioral Sequences

Consequences
Ambiguous Behaviors

Behavior 1

Behavior 2

Behavior 3

Positive

Positive

Positive

Positive or Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Positive or Negative

Positive

Positive

Negative

Positive or Negative

Negative

Negative

Positive

Positive or Negative

Negative

Positive

Positive

Positive or Negative

Positive

Negative

Negative

Positive or Negative

Neutral

Neutral

Neutral

Positive or Negative

Note.

"Positive" indicates socially desirable behaviors.

"Negative"

indicates socially undesirable behaviors, and "neutral" indicates
behaviors that are neither socially desirable nor socially undesirable.
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Essentially a two (sex of experimenter) by three (subject's cognitive level of operation) by two (evaluative consequences of the final
action) by seven (stimulus conditions) fractional factorial design with
subjects nested within the last two factors was employed.

Procedure
Stimulus conditions.

Two stimulus sequences described an actor

behaving across three scenes in either consistently positive or negative
manners.

Each scene or story was characterized by three different modal-

ities of behavior that were evaluatively consistent.

These sequences

were meant to test the hypotheses of whether subjects at different levels
of cognitive development made different dispositional attributions and
prediction ratings.

Further these sequences were meant to determine

whether different cognitive levels would use the prior behavioral information in explanations of ambiguous actions.
The second two sequences described an actor behaving across three
scenes in an inconsistent manner.

That is, the first two scenes depicted

the actor behaving in a socially desirable or socially undesirable
manner, followed by a third scene that described a behavior evaluatively
inconsistent with the previous two.

This was meant to determine whether

subjects systematically resolve the inconsistency in a manner that
allows the assessment of the actor's dispositions and the explanation
of ambiguous behaviors.

Two sequences were also presented to all sub-

jects that were the reverse of the two sequences described above, that
is, the first story was inconsistent with the second and third.

These

sequences were necessary to determine any effects due to the ordering
of the information within a sequence.
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The seventh sequence described an actor behaving across three scenes
in evaluatively neutral manners.

This might be considered a control se-

quence that tested the effects of non-evaluative information on .attributions of dispositions and explanations of ambiguous behaviors.
The seven sequences just described are summarized in Table 1.

Al-

though these sequences ·have been described sequentially to permit clarity
of explanation, the actual stimulus presentations were alternated· to
control for any effects due to the ordering of the sequences.

Further,

any given positive or negative behavior within a sequence appeared at
least once in all evaluatively similar positions within both consistent
and inconsistent sequences.
Finally, all sequences contained a final ambiguous behavior that the
subject was asked to explain.

That is, the subjects were asked to pre-

dict whether the actor actually performed that action, and, if be did,
whether it was performed intentionally or unintentionally. 10
Stimulus tasks.

The stimulus items consisted of seven different

sequences of stories that were individually read to the subjects.

Each

sequence consisted of three separate stories or descriptions of behaviors
involving an actor of unspecified age behaving in positive, negative or
neutral manners (see examples in Appendix A).

These stories had been

previously rated by 30 individuals of comparable ages to the subjects to
determine those behaviors that were low in variability with respect to
perceived social desirability.

That is, behaviors were chosen on the

basis of whether a given action was rated by individuals as consistently
socially desirable, undesirable, or neutral.

After the sequence of

stories was read, subjects were questioned on whether they had perceived
the actor in the preceeding three stories as "really meaning to; sort of

r
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meaning to; sort of not meaning to; or really not meaning to" perform

the behaviors.

Subjects were then questioned to determine the extent to

which they had made a dispositional attribution to the actor depicted in
the stories.

Measures used in determining whether a dispositional

attribution had been made were a pictoral rating scale and a behavior
prediction test (see section on dependent

me~sures).

After the dispositional ratings were made by the subject, a fourth
story was read that depicted the same actor as associated with, although
not clearly responsible for, actions that had resulted _in either positive
or negative sequences (see examples in Appendix D).

These final actions

had been previously rated by individuals of comparable ages to the subjects to determine those behaviors that were low in variability with
respect to the perceived "severity" of the consequences.

After this

final story was read, subjects were questioned on whether they thought
the actor actually performed or was responsible for the actions.

If the

subject thought that the actor had performed those actions, the subject
was ·then questioned on whether the actor "really meant to; sort of meant
to; sort of did not mean to; or really did not mean to" perform the
actions.
Subjects were then asked to recall the behavioral description they
most remembered and the other stories that had been read.

This served

as a check on whether differences in attributions might be attributed to
differential attention to the behaviors or the inability to remember
what behaviors were depicted.

These procedures were then repeated with

the other six stimulus conditions.
Dependent measures.

I1':1l:'. c:Eately after tb"' - :quence of three stories

was presented and prior to presentation of the story depicting ambiguous
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behaviors, the subjects were asked whether they thought the actor had
performed the preceeding behaviors intentionally.

That is, whether the

actor "really meant to; sort of meant to; sort of did not mean to; or
really did not mean to" perform all of the behaviors within the sequence
was assessed.

To test the extent to which various ages were able to

infer dispositions from the behavioral information given, two scales
were alternately given after the subjects were questioned on the intentionality of the actor's behaviors.

Recently, Buchanan and Thompson

(1973) and Costanzo et al., (1973·) have convincingly shown the technical
advantages of using rating scales in developmental studies of judgments.
The first scale was a pictoral rating scale developed by the author for
use with children.

This instrument portrays two sets of pictures, hope-

fully, reflecting "good" and "bad" personality characteristics.

Each

set consists of three pictures similar in all respects except in size.
Once the subject had verbally responded to the actor as either a "good"
or "bad" boy, the appropriate set of pictures was randomly displayed
paired with a label that the experimenter verbally presented.

For ex-

ample, the three "good boy" pictures in Set I might be presented in order
of diminishing size and appropriately labeled as "very, very good;
a little bit good."

good;

The subject is then asked to point to that picture

and verbally label how "good" the actor is thought to be.

Assigning a

value to each picture establishes a bipolar six-point scale (see Appendix B).

The second dependent measure, revised and shortened by the author,

was initially developed for a study using children by Morrison and Mancuso (1974).

This instrument supports Livesley and Bromley's advocacy

of using Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory as a guide to the
study of children's person perception.

Kelly's main theorem stresses

,

rr.
~
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the centrality of prediction in person-construing, which like all construing provides actors with a repertoire of possible predictions about
actors.

The behavior prediction test, a two-choice, four item stick-

figure test asks the subject to indicate his expectation that the story
character would typically engage in either a "good" behavior or a "bad"
behavior in a variety of school and home situations.

Children indicate

their choice by drawing an "X" over the illustrated behavior that they
expect from the actor in the story (see Appendix C).
After these scales were administered, the fourth story depicting a
behavior that has resulted in either positive or negative consequences
was read to subjects.

The subjects were then asked whether the actor

performed or did not perform the action that led to the consequences.
That is, the subject might have been asked, for example, "Do you think
i t was John who ran into the table knocking down all of the dishes?"

If

the response was affirmative, the subject was subsequently asked whether
the actor "really meant to; sort of meant to; sort of did not mean to;
or really did not mean to" break the dishes.
Summary.

In summary, all subjects were presented with sequences of

behaviors that were consistently or inconsistently either positive or
negative.

After this presentation, each subject was asked whether he or

she thought the behaviors were performed intentionally.

Two scales were

then alternately given that were meant to assess the extent to which a
dispositional attribution had been made.

A fourth and final behavior was

then presented that was ambiguous with respect to whether the actor had
actually performed the action and the intentions underlying that action.
This action was characte"'"izec 1-y alternating :'r--:.tive and negative consequences across all stimulus sequences for all subjects.

Subjects were
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then asked whether they thought the actor had actually performed the
actions.

If the subject's response was affirmative, he or she was

further questioned on whether he or she thought the actor intended to .
produce the consequences.

Finally, the subjects were asked to recall

the behaviors depicted in the initial sequence of behaviors. 11

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Subjects
Eighty-five children and adults were tested with the experimental
tasks.

Twenty-eight subjects were classified in each of the three levels

of cognitive development;

namely, preoperational, concrete, and formal.

On the basis of chronological age, one child was hypothesized to be
operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development, but passed
both Piagetian tasks indicating that he was operating on a "concrete"
level.

To facilitate statistical analyses, this subject was excluded

from the data and another child substituted.
deviations are presented in Table 2.

Mean ages and standard

Included in this table are the

mean ages and standard deviations broken down by sex of the subjects.
Attributed intentionality to the actor's behaviors.

A two (sex of

the experimenter) by three (subject's level of cognitive development)
by seven (behavioral sequence) analysis of variance with subjects nested
in the first two factors and repeated across the third was used to analyze
the four-point scale of perceived intentions.

The analysis of variance

summary table and the means and standard deviations of the intentionality
ratings for the three levels of cognitive development are presented in
Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
Main effects for intentionality ratings.

No significant differences

in ratings were found as a function of the sex of the experimenter.
main effect of cognitive level of operation was significant,
16.1367,

E < .00001.

Planned comparisons
39

(WinP~,

The

f (2, 78) =

1971) between the -

40

TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Age of Subjects

cognitive level

n

mean

standard deviation

preoperational
male

13

77 .}0

3.30

female

15

79.87

5.28

both

28

78.86

4.53

7

117.57

6.58

female

21

115.52

7.78

both

28

116.04

7.44

male

10

239.50

37.44

female

18

236.39

42.50

both

28

237.50

40.08

concrete
male

formal

Note.

Means and standard deviations are presented by months.
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TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Intentionality Ratings

Source
Sex of experimenter (A)
Cognitive level (B)
Ax B
Error (between)
Behavioral sequence (C)

MS

df

2 . 328

1

1.024

16.678

2

16.137*

1.818

2

2.273

78

5.129

6

8.742*

F

.800

Ax

c

.217

6

.370

Bx

c

.722

12

1.231

C

.576

12

.982

Error' (within)

.587

468

Ax B

X

*.E. <.00001

TABLE 4

Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Broken-down by Cognitive
Level and Sequencel2

Behavioral Sequence

Cognitive Level
ppp

PPN

NPP

Neutral

NNP

PNN

NNN

mean

1. 785

2.464

2.214

2.464

2.571

2.607

2.429

standard deviation

1.101

1.071

.957

1.071

1.034

1.100

1. 200

1. 286

2.179

1.929

1.821

1.929

1. 821

. 1.464

.535

.945

.940

.819

.940

.819

.693

1.179

1. 750

1.286

1.536

1.857

1.536

1.429

.548

.887

.600

.793

1.044

.838

.742

Preoperational

Concrete
mean
standard deviation
Formal
m~an

standard deviation

Note.

Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("really meant to") to 4 ("really did not mean to").
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preoperational ratings and the combined concrete and formal subjects'
ratings indicated that the younger children judged the intentions of the
actor over all behaviors as significantly less intentional than the
judgments made by the two older groups of subjects, F(l, 78)
E <.04 (see Figures 1 and 2).

= 4.343,

Specifically, the preoperational children

tended 'to distribute their ratings across the categories of intentionality
and the older subjects primarily made ratings of "really mean to" (55.9%
of responses) and "sort of mean to" (27.8% of responses).
centages are presented in Table 5.

These per-

This finding indicates that preoper-

ational children less consistently than older subjects attribute intentionality to an actor's behaviors.

These results may also be supportive

of the findings of other researchers that the ability to consider matters
of intentionality is a relatively late-maturing accomplishment of middle
childhood (Kohlberg, 1969).

That is, theorists have previously hypothe-

sized that preoperational children may have difficulty "decentering"
from behaviors to consider the actor's intentions.

If this logic is

true, it should not be surprising that younger children attribute intentions on less of a systematic basis than older subjects.
A main effect for behavioral sequence was also significant, F (6,
468)

= 8.742, E <.00001.

Planned comparisons revealed that the sets of

consistent behaviors (i.e., PPP, NNN) were rated as significantly more
polarized (i.e., ratings tended to be more towards the "really mean to"
end of the scale) than sets of inconsistent behaviors (i.e., PPN, NPP,
NNP, PNN), F (1, 468) = 33.143, £ <.00001.

As illustrated in Figures

1 and 2, evaluatively consistent behaviors across a given sequence led
to the actions of the actor be'ing rated as more intentional than cvaluatively inconsistent behaviors.

Additionally, consistently positive
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TABLE 5
Percentage of Responses in Each

Intention~lity

Intentionality Category

Category Broken-down by Cognitive Level

Cognitive Level
Preoperational

Concrete

Formal

All

"rea 1 ly meant to"

29.6%

45.9%

65.8%

47.1%

"sort of meant to"

23.0%

34.7%

20.9%

26.2%

"sort of didn't mean to"

29.1%

15.3%

9.7%

18.0%

"really didn't mean to"

18.4%

4.1%

3.6%

8.7%

Note.

The chi-square revealed a significant relationship between cognitive level and response
category, (x2(6) = 89.183, p <.0001).

r

..
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behaviors tended to be rated as more intentional than consistently negative behaviors,

~

(83)

= 3.23, E

<.002.

Further analyses of the main effect for behavioral sequence disclosed
no significant differences between inconsistent sets as a function of the
frequencies of positive and negative behaviors (i.e., PPN and NPP sets
compared to PNN and NNP sequences) ;, .! ( 83) = 1. 06, .E_ > .10.

That is,

intentionality ratings did not vary as a function of the degree of evaluative "positivity" or "negativity" within a set.
To check for effects of order of information within a set, NNP
sequences were compared to PNN sets and PPN sequences were contrasted with
NPP sets.· Employing t-tests, it was found that PNN sets and NNP sequences were rated as equally intentional,

~

(83)

= 1.16,

.E_

>.10.

How-

ever, NPP sequences were rated as significantly more intentional than PPN
sets, .! (83) = 2.33, .E_ <.022.
Comparing intentionality ratings of the neutral information with the
combined ratings of the consistent behaviors revealed significantly
higher or "less intentional" ratings for the neutral information (_! (83)

= 3.63,

.E. <.001).

That is, subjects rated the consistent information

as more intentional than the neutral behaviors.

A comparison of ratings

based on the neutral information with those based on the combined inconsistent sets was not

significant,~

(83)

=

.78, .E_ >.10.

In summary,

consistently positive information is rated as more intentional than the
other sequences.

However, before hypotheses are advanced in explanation

of any of the trends across behavioral sequences, an examination must be
made of these trends across the three cognitive levels.
Interaction effects for intentionality ratings.

Although the over-

all interaction between the subject's cognitive level of operation and
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r
r
1·:

the behavioral sequence was not significant (see Table 3), further
analyses were made using planned comparisons.
These comparisons revealed that both preoperational children and
grouped concrete and formal subjects rated consistent sets as more intentional than inconsistent sets (F (1, 468)

= 38.879, E <.001, respectively).

= 7.72, E <.01, F (1, 468)

This finding is supportive of hypoth-

esis IA that older subjects base their ratings of intentionality on the
evaluative consistency of the set.

Further, it was found that consis:

tently positive information elicited higher ratings of intentionality
from combined concrete and formal subjects than the consistently negative
information,

!

(1, 468)

= 3.896, E <.05.

This result is in contrast to

hypothesis IB which stated that the older subjects would equally polarize
ratings based on consistently positive and negative information.

However,

examination of Table 5 indicates that the lower ratings of the· consistently negative sequences was due largely to the older subjects making
more frequent ratings of "sort of meant to" as opposed to when the behaviors were consistently positive.

More specifically, the percentages

of responses in the combined "really meant to" and "sort of meant to"
categories were similar for both the consistently positive and negative
sequences (94.6% and 91.1%, respectively).

It then appears that the less

polarized ratings based on the negative information resulted from more
conservative estimates of intentions and not a failure to attribute
intentionality.
Preoperational children also rated the consistently positive sequences as more intentional than the consistently negative sequences

! (1, 468)

= 5. 97 3, E <. 05.

F ·. ;ever, \vh en presente! ' · th the consistent-

ly negative information, they tended to make more ratings in the cate-
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gories of "sort of did not mean to" and "really did not mean to" than
when the information was consistently positive.

·-

Thus, the percentages

in both the "meant to" categories dropped from 78.5% when consistent
information was positive to 50.0% when the information was negative.
When the information is consistently negative, it appears that preoperational children fail to systematically ·attribute intentionality.
Neither preoperational children nor grouped concrete and formal
subjects significantly differentiated intentions on the basis of frequency of positive or negative behaviors within an inconsistent set, (F
(1, 468) = 3.426,

~

<.07,! (1, 468) = .0076,

~

>.10, respectively).

That is, neither the preoperational subjects nor the combined concrete
and formal subjects differentiated between grouped PPN and NPP sequences
as contrasted with the grouped PNN and NNP sequences.

However, there

did appear to be a marginal tendency· for preoperational children to rate
inconsistent behavioral sets containing two positive behaviors as more
intentional than sequences containing only one (hypothesis liB).

This

finding plus the earlier stated evidence that consistently positive information is rated by preoperational children as more intentional than
consistently negative gives credence to hypothesis II that younger chi!dren will base ratings of intentionality on the evaluative positivity of
the behavioral information.

As Costanzo et al. (1974) had earlier

hypothesized, this may result from parental rearing practices that may
focus on the intentions of an actor when the consequences arepositive
or beneficial to others.

Thus, preoperational children may more easily

have learned to attribute intentionality to positive behaviors than negative actions.

These trends in attributions of intentions by cognitive

levels are illustrated in Figure 2.

Preoperational children appear to
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be basing their ratings on the "positivity" of the behavioral set, and
concrete and formal subjects seem to base their attributions of intentionality on the "consistency" of the set.
Planned comparisons were also made to see if preoperational and
grouped concrete and formal subjects would differentiate between NNP and
PNN sequences.

Neither preoperational children nor combined concrete

and formal subjects significantly differentiated their ratings on the
basis of these sets (F (1, 468)

£ >.10, respectively).

= .274, £ >.10,

F (1, 468)

= 2.9830,-

However, when comparisons were made between PPN

and NPP sequences, differences in ratings for the cognitive levels were
found.

That is, combined concrete and formal subjects rated NPP sequences

as more intentional than PPN sets, F (1, 468)

= 6.712, E <.01.

In con-

trast, preoperational children did not make a distinction between these
sets, F (1, 468)

=

1.096, .£. >.10.

Examining Figure 1 indicates that

the greatest differences in ratings between the NPP and PPN sets were
for the formal subjects.

This may indicate that older subjects view the

information in a temporally sequential manner.

Specifically, positive

information coming last in a sequence may be perceived as indicative of
the actor's present nature and, thus, more intentional.

This reasoning

may similarly explain the marginal tendency for grouped concrete and
formal subjects to rate PNN sequence as more intentional than NNP sets.
Across preoperational, concrete, and formal levels of cognitive
development, neutral behaviors were increasingly rated as more intentional.

This again reflects a failure of preoperational children to attri-

bute intentions behind actions.
children nor grouped

concre~~

Statistically, neither preoperational

anc formal subjectc

~tfferentiated

neutral behaviors and combined inconsistent behaviors (F (1, 468)

between

=

.2465,

,

r
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~

>.10,

E (1,

468)

= 1.657,

~

>.10, respectively).

However, both pre-

operational and grouped concrete and formal subjects did differentiate
between neutral behaviors and combined consistent behaviors (F (1, 468)
= 5.844, ~ <.05, F (1, 468)

= 5.864,

~

<.05, respectively).

This may

indicate that neutral behaviors are devoid of any elements that would
·make the consistency of the behaviors salient.

That is, neutral behav-

iors are neither evaluatively positive nor negative, thus the consistency
of the behaviors is difficult to determine.
may hinder attributions of intentionality.

For older subjects, this
It might be further argued

that since neutral behaviors lie somewhere along the middle of the continuum of "degree of positivity," preoperational children would make
attributions of intentionality similar to those ratings based on the
inconsistent information, assuming additivity.
Further interaction effects for intentionality ratings.

No higher

order interaction effects between the sex of the experimenter, cognitive
level of operation, or the behavioral sequence were significant.
An unequal n, two (sex of experimenter) by two (sex of subject) by
three (cognitive level of operation) analysis of variance was performed
to check for interactions between the sex of the experimenter and the
sex of the subject across the three cognitive levels (see Table 6).

No

main effects for the sex of the experimenter or the sex of the subjects
were significant for ratings of intentionality.

Further, no interactions

occurred between the subject's sex and the sex of the experimenter.
was

a

There

significant interaction between the experimenter's sex and the

cognitive level.

Examination of Table 7 indicates that this latter in-

teraction was due to the formal subj ::c t 's rating

beh~"

· trs as more in ten-

tiona! when the experimenter was female as opposed to when the experimen-
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TABLE 6
Unequal n Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Intentionality Ratings

Source

Sex of Subject (A)

MS

df

F

.233

1

.271

2.149

1

2.499

37.205

2

43.257*

Ax B

.103

1

.120

X

c

.422

2

.491

B X

c

2.569

2

2.986**

.094

2

.109

.860

576

Sex of Experimenter (B)
Cognitive Level (C)

A

Ax B

.X

c

Error

*.E. <.001
**.E. <.06
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TABLE 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Broken-down by
Sex of Experimenter and Sex of Subject

sex

n

mean*

standard deviation

preoperational

8

2.411

1.156

concrete

3

1.810

~680

formal

5

1.600

.736

preoperational

5

2.229

1. 239

concrete

4

1.857

1.113

formal

5

1.257

.561

6

2.405

1.149

11

1.701

.796

9

1. 746

1.031

9

2.365

.921

10

1.814

.856

9

1.365

.655

Male subject
Male experimenter

Female experimenter

Female subject
Male experimenter
preoperational
concrete
formal
Female experimenter
preoperational
concrete
formal

*

Mean rating ranged from 1 ("really meant to") to 4 ("really did not
mean to").
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ter was male.
Summary.

In summary, preoperational children do not attribute in-

tentions underlying behaviors as readily as the older concrete and formal
subjects.

In part, this may result from the inability to decenter from

the actual behaviors depicted in the sequence.

Thus, not being attuned

to the intentionalit'y of the actions, preoperational children typically
do not focus on the consistency of the behaviors as indicative of the
actors' intentions.

Learning experiences of children, however, facili-

tate the perception of intentions when the behavioral information is
positive.

Thus, sets consisting of more positive behaviors are seen as

enacted more intentionally than sequences consisting of negative behaviors.

Finally, it might be concluded that although older subjects appar-

ently base intentionality ratings primarily on the consistency of the
set, preoperational children tend to base intentions on the evaluative
positivity of the information within the set.
Dispositional attributions to the actor.

Dispositional ratings

were m.ade by subjects on "good boy" or ''bad boy" scales, each consisting
of three points, visually and verbally differentiated by degrees of
"goodness" or "badness."

Taken together, the scales were considered as

unidimensional and assumed to be of equal interval, varying from the
lowest rating of "very, very, good" to the highest rating of "very, very,
bad."

This scale was alternately presented with the prediction measure

immediately following the assessment of intentionality questions.

Analy-

sis of the dispositional measure was done using a two (sex of experimenter) by three (subjects' level of cognitive development) by seven (behavioral sequence) analysis of variance with

subject~

.first two factors and repeated across the third.

nested within the

r,
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Main effects for dispositional ratings.

No main effects were found

for the sex of the experimenter or the cognitive level of operation (see
Table 8).

This latter finding is in contrast to the significant differ-

ences in intentionality ratings that were made by the three cognitive
levels.

A main effect for dispositional ratings was found for the be-

havioral sequence, F (6,468)

= 71.635, E

<.001.

This finding is not

particularly surprising since it merely indicates that subjects were
using the behavioral information in making their dispositional ratings.
This same effect for behavioral sequence was found for the intentionality
ratings.

Examination of the means presented in Table 9 indicates that

subjects "average" the behavioral information in making their dispositional ratings (Anderson, 1965).

That is, the "goodness" or "badness"

of ratings appears to be a function of the frequencies of good and bad
behaviors within the sequence.

Consistently posit.ive or negative se-

quences elicited the most extreme ratings and inconsistent sets were
rated somewhere between these extremes.

Inconsistent sets characterized

by two positive behaviors (i.e., PPN, NPP) elicited significantly more
positive attributions than sets characterized by only one positive behavior (i.e., PNN, NNP),

~

(83) = 9.04, E <.01.

To check for effects of order of information within a set, NNP sequences were compared to PNN sets and PPN sequences were contrasted with
NNP sets.

It was found that PPN sets elicited ratings equivalent to the

NNP sequences,

~

(83)

=

.53,

E >.10.

However, dispositional ratings

based on NNP sequences were more positive than the attributions based on
the PNN sets,

~

(83) = 2.83,

E <.006.

Inte-:- ........ tion effects for dispositional ratings.

The only inter-

action found for the dispositional ratings was between cogni-

,
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TABLE 8
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Dispositional Ratings

Source

MS

df

F

Sex of experimenter (A)

1.634

1

.341

Cognitive level (B)

5.583

2

1.164

Ax B

9.369

2

1.953

4.798

78

103.094

6

71. 635*

Error (between)
Behavioral sequence (C)
Ax

c

.321

6

.223

Bx

c

4.665

12

·3. 241**

.990

12

.688

1.439

468

AxB XC
Error (within)

*

p <.0001

** p <.01

TABLE 9

Means and Standard Deviations for Dispositional Ratings Broken-down
by Cognitive Level and Sequence

Behavioral Sequence
:ognitive Level
NNP

PPN

NNN

3.107

4.143

4.071

4.214

1. 762

1.912

1.604

1.804

1. 779

3.036

3,107

2.464

3.929

4. 714

5.250

.497

1.290

1.286

1,261

1.514

1.013

1.005

1.464

2.750

2.429

2.143

3.643

4.357

4.857

.962

1.110

.920

1.044

1.129

1.16"2 .

1.380

PPP

PPN

NNP

mean

2.143

2.536

3.071

standard deviation

1. 779

1.710

1.393

Neutral

Preoperational

Concrete
mean
standard deviation
Formal
mean
standard deviation

Note.

Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("very, very good") to 6 ("very, very bad").
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tive level of operation and behavioral sequence,
~

<.01.

! (12, 468) = 3.241,

Examination of Figures 3 and 4 reveals that concrete and formal

subjects did base dispositional attributions on the evaluative positivity
or negativity of the behavioral sets.

The combined ratings of the con-

crete and formal subjects, however, were not significantly more polarized than the ratings of the preoperational children,

£ >.10.

~

(82)

= 1.40,

That is, deviations from the midpoint of the dispositional

scale were no more extreme for the preoperational or combined concrete
and formal subjects.

As supportive of hypotheses IliA and IIIb, con-

sistently positive information resulted in evaluatively positive ratings
and consistently negative behaviors resulted in evaluatively negative
attributions made by the concrete and formal subjects.

Again, these

ratings based on only consistent information were no more polarized for
the .combined concrete and formal subjects than for the preoperational
children, .! (82)

= . 30,

£ >.10.

A t-test revealed that older subjects

did polarize positive information more toward the positive end of the
dispositional scale than negative information was polarized toward the
"very, very bad" end of the continuum,.! (55)

= 2.81,

~

<.01 (one tailed).

This latter finding is non-supportive of hypothesis IIC that predicted
that older subjects would equally polarize dispositional ratings of
consistently positive and negative sequences.

However, for the majority

of older subjects both consistently positive and negative sequences did
produce extreme dispositional ratings.

That is, consistently positive

sequences elicited dispositional attributions of "very, very good" or
"good" from-all of the concrete subjects and 92.3% of the formal subjects.

Consistently negative sequences were rated as "very, very had"

or "bad" by 82.2% of the concrete subjects and 78.6% of the formal sub-:-
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jects (_see Table 10).
Examining Figures 3 and 4 also indicates that preoperation children
tend to base the evaluative positivity or negativity of their dispositional ratings on the consistent sequences.

Further, a t-test for the

differences between the midpoint of the scale and the consistently
positive and negative sequences was marginally significant,

1.67, E <.06 (one tailed).

~

(27) =

Positive sequences were rated as evaluatively

positive and negative sequences were rated as more evaluatively neutral
(hypotheses IVA and IVB).

Seventy-four percent of the .preoperational

children rated consistently positive sequences as either "very, very
good" or ''good," but only 50% of these subjects rated consistently
negative sequences as "very, very bad" or "bad."

Further, the distri-

bution of dispositional responses for the consistently negative sequences
as compared to the consistently positive sequences may indicate that
preoperational children have greater difficulty assigning dispositions
to the negative information as compared to positive behaviors.

Although

the standard deviations for these consistent sequences were identical,
it should be noted that the generally higher deviations for the preoperational children as contrasted with the older groups may be reflective
of the difficulty preoperational children may have in making dispositional attributions.
Planned comparisons of the ratings of both preoperational and
grouped concrete and formal subjects substantiated the earlier finding
that" subjects attribute more positive dispositions to PPN and NPP sequences as contrasted with NNP and PNN behaviors (!:. (1, 468)

E <.001, F (1, 468)

=

78.422, 2 <.001 , r espectively) .

= 24.624,

Specifically,

when presented with inconsistent sets, all subjects appear to be basing

TABLE 10
Percent Usage of Dispositional Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence
Responses Across Sequences
Dispositional Category

"very, very
good"
"good"
"a little
bit good"

"a little
bit bad"
"bad"

"very, very
· bad"

pppa

PPNb

NNPC

neutrald

NNPe

PNNt

NNNg

preoperational
concrete
formal

60.7%
·6o. 7%
71.4%

39.3%
14.3%
7.1%

25.0%
7.1%
7.1%

25.0%
17.9%
21.4%

7.1%
10.7%
0.0%

17.9%
0.0%
0.0%

17.9%
0.0%
0.0%

preoperational
concrete
formal

14.3%
39.3%
21.4%

17.9%
17.9%
35.7%

21.4%
25.0%
60.7%

25.0%
50.0%
57.1%

7.1%
7.1%
14.3%

3.6%
3.6%
10.7%

3.6%
0.0%
14.3%

preoperational
concrete
formal

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

21.4%
35.7%
46.4%

. 10.7%
39.3%
17.9%

14.3%
10.7%
14.3%

21.4%
17.9%
39.3%

7.1%
7.1%
10.7%

7.1%
10.7%
3.6%

preoperational
concrete
formal

10.7%
0.0%
3.6%

3.6%
14.3%
0.0%

21.4%
14.3%
10.7%

7.1%
14.3%
3.6%

25.0%
17.9%
17.9%

25.0%
25.0%
21.4%

21.4%
7.1%
3.6%

preoperational
concrete
formal

3.6%
0.0%
3.6%

7.1%
17.9%
7.1%

7.1%
7.1%
3.6%

7.1%
3.6%
0.0%

7.1%
35.7%
25.0%

17 .• 9%
42.9%
46.4%

10.7%
28.6%
39.3%

preoperational
concrete
formal

10.7%
·0.0%
o.o%·

10.7%
0.0%
3.6%

14.3%
0.0%
0.0%

21.4%
7.1%
3.6%

32.1%
10.7%
3.6%

28.6%
21.4%
10.7%

39.3%
53.6%
39.3%

2
ax2(8)=14.55, ~ <.07
bX (10)=23.63, ~ <.01

2

cX 2 (10)=22.90,
dX (10)=14.39,

~
~

<.02
>.10

2

eX (10)=20.25,
2
fX (10)=18.02,

~
~

<.03
<.06

2 .
gX (10)=26.19,

~

<.01

0\
N
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their dispositional attributions on the evaluatively similar pieces of
information within the set.

If there are two positive behaviors within

a set, dispositional ratings will tend to be.more positive than if there
were two negative behaviors (nypotheses VA and VB).
To check for effects of order of information, PPN sequences were
contrasted with NPP sequences for preoperational children and grouped
concrete and .formal subjects.
468)
468)

= 1.787,

Neither preoperational children (F (1,

E >.10) nor combined concrete and formal subjects

(! Ci,

.099, E >.10) rated these sequences as significantly different.

However, planned comparisons revealed a difference between ratings of
NNP and PNN sequences for grouped concrete and formal subjects.

That

is, preoperational children did not differentiate their ratings on the
basis of these sequences (F (1, 468)

=

.012, .E. >.10), but the combined

concrete and formal subjects did, F (1, 468)

=

10.429 ~ .E_< • 01.

Speci-

fically, PNN sequences were rated significantly higher or "less good"
than NNP sequences.

One possible reason for the recency effects for

the negative information and not the positive, might be a bias created
by positive information.

That is, older subjects may want to give the

actor the ''benefit of the doubt" and bias ratings toward the positive
end of the continuum.

If the positive information is salient, subjects

will average the information, maximizing the weight assigned to the
similarly positive behaviors.

If the negative information is most

salient within the set (Le., PNN or NNP), older subjects will give the
actor the "benefit of the doubt" i f the single piece of positive information comes last in the sequence.

A final positive behavior may indi-

cate that the actor is changing or l1 2s changed for ·
subjects will assign a more positive rating.

better, thus

When PNN sequences are
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presented, it is difficult to justify a positive rating because the actor appears to be changing for the worse.

In summary, these results

seem to indicate that older concrete and formal subjects tend to view
the behavioral information in some sort of temporally sequential manner.
Contrasting PPP behavioral sets with combined PPN and NPP sequences
revealed significant differences for rating by both the preoperational
and grouped concrete and formal levels of cognitive development (F (1,
468)

= 6.618,

~

<.05, F (1, 468)

= 49.045,

~

<.001, respectively).

How-

ever, contrasting NNN behavioral sets with combined NNP and PNN sequences
revealed a difference for only the ratings of the grouped concrete and
formal subjects, but not the preoperational children (F (1, 468)
~

<.001 7 F (1, 468)

=

.335,

~

>.10, respectively).

= 19.458,

These differential

trends for dispositional ratings by preoperational children may be reflective of their tendency to attribute intentionality to PPP sequences
as contrasted with either the PPN or NPP sets.
intentionality of

th~

That is, the perceived

behaviors may have facilitated the polarization

of the dispositional attributions.

Of course, this same tendency is

apparent in the ratings of the combined concrete and formal subjects.
Specifically, the PPP sequences being perceived as more intentional
than PPN and NPP sequences, subsequently were assigned more positively
polarized ratings.
As compared to the older subjects, preoperational children did not
differentiate between NNN sequences and ·combined NNP and PNN. sequences.
This may be reflective of the preoperational children's failure to
differentiate intentions underlying NNN behaviors as contrasted with
either NNP or PNN behavioral sequences.

This failure to discern inten-

tionality underlying either the consistent or inconsistent sets may
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hinder any differential dispositional attributions.

Thus, dispositional

ratings based on NNN, NNP or PNN sequences are all evaluatively similar.
This tendency to polarize judgments as a function of attributed
intentionality is further supported by the correlations between intentionality ratings and dispositional judgments adjusted to reflect polarity.

That is, assigning the same score to equally polarized disposi-

tional ratings permits correlations to be performed between the polarity
of judgment and perceived intentions.

The more intentional the behav-

iors are perceived, the more extreme or polarized

shoul~

be the dispo-

sitional ratings.

Specifically, the correlations obtained for PPP be-

havioral sequences

were~

and~

jects

subjects.
another,

(54) = .347,

E

(26) = .263, E >.10, for preoperational sub<.10 for the combined concrete and formal

These correlations were not significantly different from one
~

=

.319, E >.10.

Correlations between intentionality and

dispositional judgments for the NNN behavioral sequences were marginally
higher for the grouped concrete and formal subjects (r (54)
<. 001) as compared to the preoperational children
~ =

1.65,

E

(~

(26)

=

.569,

E

= .187, E >.10),

<.10 . . It is then plausible that the attribution of inten-

tionality is necessary before polarized judgments will be made.

Only

if a behavioral sequence is perceived as intentionally enacted will the
actor be consistently labeled as "very, very good" or "very, very bad."
Preoperational children do attribute intentionality to consistently
positive behaviors, subsequently polarizing their dispositional judgments.

Consistently negative behaviors, however, are not perceived as

intentionally enacted, thus preoperational children fail to polarize
their judgments.
The dispositional ratings based on the neutral behaviors were ex-
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pected to be evaluatively similar to the inconsistent sequences.
Specifically, all cognitive levels were expected to rate the neutral
behaviors midway between ratings based on consistently positive and
consistently negative sequences.

Examining Figure 3 'indicates that all

cognitive levels rated neutral behaviors as somewhat similar to the PPN
and NPP sequences.

This trend may indicate a bias of subjects to assign

more positive dispositions when the behavioral information presented
is evaluatively neutral.

-

That is, subjects appear to give the "benefit

of the doubt" to the actor when the information presented is evaluatively neither positive nor negative.
In addition to the above analyses, an

unequal~'

two (sex of ex-

perimenter) by two (sex of subject) by three (cognitive level of operation) analysis of variance was performed to check for any interaction
between sex of the experimenter and the sex of· the subject across cognitive levels (see Table 11).

No main effects for sex of subject, sex

of experimenter, or cognitive level of operation was significant.

There

was, however, an interaction between the sex of subject and the sex of
the experimenter, F (1, 576)

= 7.038, E

<.008.

Comparisons of means

presented in Table 12 indicate that pairs of similarly sexed experimenters and subjects produced lower or evaluatively more positive dispositions than heterosexual pairs.
intentionality ratings.

This interaction was not found for the

Similarly, the interaction between sex of the

experimenter and cognitive level was significant for dispositional ratings

(!.

(2, 576)

=

3.382, E. <.05)_, but not the intentionality ratings.

Examining Table 12 reveals that the dispositional ratings made for the
femal"' · :perimenter were more or less constant across cognitive levels,
but the ratings for the male experimenter declined across levels.

Un-
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TABLE 11
Unequal n Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Dispositional Ratings

Source

MS

df

F

Sex of subject (A)

3.300

1

1.130

Sex of experimenter (B)

2.051

1

.702

Cognitive level (C)

5 . 743

2

1.967

A

X

B

20.549

1

7.038*

Ax

c

3.885

2

1.331

B X

c

9.877

2

3.382**

12.877

2

4.410**

2,920

576

Ax B x

c

Error

*
**

p <.01
p <.05
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TABLE 12
Means and Standard Deviations for Dispositional Ratings Broken-down by
Sex of Subject and Sex of Experimenter

n

mean*

preoperational

8

3.357

2.040

concrete

3

3.190

1.887

formal

5

3.057

1.679

preoperational

5

3.886

1.922

concrete

4

3.286

.1. 843

formal

5

3.371

1.682

6

4.000

2.012

11

3.455

1.667

9

2.952

1.507

9

2.540

1.435

10

3.486

1.595

9

3.095

1.563

Sex

standard deviation

Male subject
Male experimenter

Female experimenter

Female subject
Male experimenter
preoperational
concrete
formal
Female experimenter
preoperational
concrete
formal

*Mean ratings ren"ed from 1 ("very, very good") to 6 ("very, very bad").
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like the intentionality ratings, the three-way interaction between sex
of experimenter, sex of subject, and cognitive level was also significant

(f

(2, 576)

=

2.674, E <.002.

The means presented in Table 12

indicate that the sex of ·experimenter, sex of subject interaction was
primarily due to ratings made by preoperational children.

The reasons

for these interactions, however, are difficult to determine since it is
not known whether the trends in data resulted from the sex of the experimenter per se or some particular qualities of the experimenter
independent of sex (i.e., there was only one experimenter of each sex).
Further, since this was essentially a secondary analysis of previously
analyzed data, these findings may be due to chance.
Summary.

In summary, formal and concrete subjects appeared to

base dispositional judgments on the "set" of behavioral information.
As predicted, sets of consistently positive behaviors resulted in evaluatively positive ratings and negative behaviors resulted in evaluatively
negative judgments.

Although these ratings were not equally polarized,

they appeared to be more polarized than the comparable ratings of the
preoperational children.

Further, the ratings of the inconsistent in-

formation were less polarized than the ratings based on the consistent
sequences.

Concrete and formal subjects apparently "average" inconsis-

tent behavioral information, primarily basing dispositional ratings on
the evaluatively similar behaviors within the set.

There also seems to

be some evidence that concrete and formal subjects view the entire sequence in somewhat of a temporally sequential manner.

That is, there

appears to be a recency effect for the evaluatively similar behaviors
within inconsistent sets.
Subjects operating on the preoperational level also appear to be
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basing dispositional ratings on the behavioral informntion presented.
As predicted, evaluatively positive behaviors resulted in positive ratings, and evaluatively negative behaviors tended to be rated as more
neutral.

That is, negative information resulted in ratings that

appeared to be less polarized than ratings ensuing from positive actions.
This is perhaps the result of the child's differential abilities at
perceiving the intentions underlying actions.

It is possible that con-

sistently positive behaviors are seen as more reflective of intentionality than consistently negative actions.

The intentionality of the

positive behaviors may then be sufficient information to guide dispositional attributions.
As contrasted with concrete and formal subjects, the dispositional
ratings of preoperational children cannot totally be explained by a
simple averaging model when the behavioral information is inconsistent.
That is, preoperational children appear to be basing dispositional
ratings on the information that is most salient within the behavioral
set.

In the behavioral sequences presented, the two evaluatively

similar behaviors would be most salient.

This is in contrast to the

earlier predictions that preoperational children would base dispositional ratings on the roost temporally recent behavior within the set, independent of the preceeding behaviors.

This indicates that children

do not absolutely shift their perspective as the information changes,
but can consider earlier information before making dispositional judgroents.

However, this does not indicate that children will use the

entire sequence in assigning ratings.

Rather, the child's egocentrism

and failure at mastering the concept of ·- -Jariance may have forced him
or her to use only the most salient or evaluatively similar behaviors
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within the sequence.

This process appears to be further mediated by

the evaluative polarity of the behavioral information that may or may
not make salient the intentions of the actor.

Specifically, consistent-

ly positive information highlights theintentionality of the actor, thus
facilitating a distinction between PPP behavioral sets as contrasted
with PPN and NPP sequences •. Consistently negative actions do not highlight the actors' intentions, thus a distinction between NNN sets and .
NNP or PPN sequences is not made.

In this latter case, dispositions ·

are based on the most salient actions, the actor being seen as absolutely bad with no differentiation of degrees of "badness."

Of course,

the less polarized judgments of preoperational children may reflect a
response bias independent of dispositional attributions.

For this and

other reasons, a different response format was chosen for making
behavioral predictions.
Subjects' Behavioral Predictions
The modified Moral Behavior Prediction Test (MBPT) was designed to
further reflect dispositional attributions.

That is, part of the reason

for making attributions is to be able to predict an actor's
haviors.

fut~re

be-

For example, an actor seen as a "good boy" might be expected

to perform good acts.

The MBPT was scored so that low scores would

reflect more positive predictions than high scores.

This allows

correlations to be made between the six-point dispositional measure and
the four-point predictions test.

That these two scales are highly re-

lated is reflected by the significantly high correlations across all
cognitive levels (i.e., preoperational: r (194)
crete:£ (194)

= .745,

~

<.001; formal: r (194)

=

.599,

=

.801, £ <.001.

~

<.001; conDes-

pite the apparent trend, a Fisher's r to z transformation revealed no
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significant differences in correlations between preoperational and
grouped concrete and formal

subjects,~=

1.17,

~

>.10.

To avoid any confounds with the actual order of presentation of the
dispositional measure and the MBPT, the scales were alternately presented across sequences for each subject.

For example, a given subject

might receive the dispositional measure followed by the MBPT for the
first sequence, the MBPT followed by the dispositional measure for the
subsequent sequence, and so on.

Using

~~tests,

no differences in the

dispositional or prediction ratings as a function of the order of
presentation was found

(~

(587) = .8987,

~

>.10;

~

(587) = .7607,

~

>.10, respectively).
A two (sex of experimenter) by three (subjects' level of cognitive
development) by seven (behavioral sequence) analysis of variance with
subjects nested within the first two factors and repeated across the
third was used for further analyses (see Tables 13 and 14).
Main effects for prediction ratings.

The effects found for pre-

diction ratings paralleled those found for the dispositional ratings
(see Table 8) with the exception of an interaction between cognitive
level and sex of experimenter which was not present for the prediction
ratings.

No main effects for either the sex of the experimenter or

cognitive level of operation were found.

A main effect for the behav-

ioral sequence was again significant,! (6, 468)

= 64.0619,

~

<.001.

Consistently positive and negative sequences produced the most polarized
ratings with inconsistent PPN and NPP sequences producing more positively polarized predictions than the NNP and PNN sequences,

~

(83)

= 8.95,

.P. < .0001.
To check for effects of order of information, NNP sequences were
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TABLE 13
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Prediction Ratings

Source
Sex of experimenter (A)
Cognitive level (B)
A

X

B

Error (between)
Behavioral sequence (C)

MS

df

3.918

1

1.436

.471

2

.173

8.883

2

3.255*

2. 729

78

80.398

6

64.062**
1.664

Ax

c

2.089

6

B

c

7 •. 671

12

.535

12

1.255

468

X

AxBx

c

Error (within)

*

p <.05

**

p <.001

***

p <.01

F

6.113***
.426

, TABLE 14
Means and Standard Deviations for Prediction Ratings Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence

Behavioral Sequence
Cognitive Level
PPP

PPN

NNP

mean

1.250

1.179

1.571

standard deviation

1.206

1.219

mean

.107

standard deviation

Neutral

NNP

PNN

NNN

1.464

2.357

2.000

2.464

1.501

1.290

1.393

1.466

1.347

1.321

1.071

1.393

2.250

3.143

3.679

.315

1.492

1.274

1.499

1.531

1.380

.863

.536

1.143

1.071

.679

2.179

3.429

3.500

1.105

.970

1.016

. 772

1.335

.836

1.000

Preoperational

Concrete
I '

Formal
mean
standard deviation

Note.

.

Mean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative prediction ratings) to 4 (four ' negative prediction
ratings).

J

J' ·
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contrasted with PNN sets and PPN sequences were contrasted with the NPP
sequences.

T-tests revealed no significant differences between NPP and

PPN sequences, .! (83) = .14, £. >.10.
nega~ively

However, PPN sequences were more

polarized than NNP sequences, !_ (83) = 3.25, £. <.002.

These

trends in behavioral predictions are similar to those fo~nd for the
dispositional ratings.
lnteraction effects for prediction ratings.

The hypothesized

interaction between cognitive level of development and behavioral sequence was found to be significant, F (12, 468)

= 6.1126,

£. <.01.

Planned comparisons between preoperational and grouped concrete and
formal subjects were performed for the consistently positive and negative sequences.

For both the consistently positive and negative sets,

the grouped concrete and formal subjects made more polarized ratings
than the preoperational children
=

8.685, £. <.01, respectfvely).

(!

(1, 78)

= 5.899,

£. <.05;

F (1, 78)

Further, the ratings of the consistent

sets by the older subjects deviated more from the midpoint of the
prediction scale than the ratings of the preoperational children, !_
(82) = 4.20, £. <.001.

This latter difference between cognitive levels,

however, was not significant when tested across all behavioral sets,

.! (82) = 1.02, £. >.10.

Both preoperational children and grouped con-

crete and formal subjects rated inconsistent sequences containing two
positive behaviors as significantly lower or "more good" than those
containing only one positive action (i.e., preoperational: F (1, 468)
10.273, £. <.01;

£. <.001).

grouped concrete and formal: F (1, 468)

= 123.06,

These statistics again support an averaging model for

prediction ratings similar to that found for the dispositional ratings
(see Figures 5 and 6).

r
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To check for effects of order of information within inconsistent
sets, PPN sequences were contrasted with NPP sequences for preoperational
children and grouped concrete and formal suhjects.
tional (F (1, 468)
jects (F (1, 468)
different.

= 2.05,

=

Neither preopera-

£. >.10) nor grouped concrete and formal sub-

.711, £. >.10) rated these sequences as significantly

Further, the preoperational children did not rate the NNP

sequences as significantly different from the PNN sets, F (1, 468)
.512, £. >.10.

=

Combined concrete and formal subjects, however, did rate

PNN sequences as more negatively polarized than NNP sets, F (1, 468)
=

22.31, £. <.01.
As with the dispositional ratings, this order effect for older

subjects may result from a sequential processing of the information.
That is, latter behaviors may be seen as more reflective of presently
existing characteristics of the actor.

This perspective would facil-

itate a discounting by subjects of the earlier inconsistent piece of
information.

Further, it is also possible that NPP sequences are not

more positively polarized than PPN sets because of a bias toward viewing the actor in the most positive light.

Thus, the inconsistent piece

of information within the inconsistent set is already being maximally
discounted.
Contrasting PPP behavioral sets with grouped PPN and NPP sequences
revealed significant differences in ratings for combined concrete and
formal subjects but not preoperational children (F (1, 468) = 19.209,

£. <.001;

F (1, 468)

=

.474, £. >.10, respectively) (see Figure 6).

This is-in contrast to similar _analyses done for the dispositional
measure where all cognitive levels indicated significant differences.
A parallel pattern was found when comparing NNN behavioral sets with
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grouped NNP and PNN sequences.

This pattern revealed differences for

only the combined concrete and formal subjects but not the preoperational
children (F (1, 468) = 19.209,

~

<.001;

F (1, 468) = 1.897,

~

>.10,

respectively).
One possible explanation for the differential finding of the
dispositional and prediction ratings by the preoperational children may
lie with the use of perceived intentions.

That is, although intentions

may be useful in the assessment of dispositions, they may not be useful in prediction of future behaviors for preoperational children.
Specifically, whereas the intentions underlying the consistently positive behaviors may have facilitated the attributions of dispositions,
they may not have been useful in the prediction of how the actor would
behave in the future.

The preoperational child may have merely ex-

amined the behaviors and used the most salient component in guiding his
or her predictions.

Concrete and formal subjects ·may have continued

to average this information before making a prediction, but similarly
ignored their prior ratings of intentionality.

For example, if a PPN

sequence is presented, older subjects may simply predict that some of
the future behaviors of the actor will be good and some will be bad,
without considering the intentions of the actor.

This is substantiated

by the low correlations between intentions and prediction ratings adjusted to reflect polarized judgments, (i.e.,

=

.155,

.049,

~

~

<.05;

concrete:

~

(194)

= .042,

~

preoperational:~

>.10;

formal:

~

(194)

(194)

=

>.10) as contrasted with the correlations between intentions

and dispositions that were all significant at the .001 level (see
7able 15).

Th ~

nplication is that the predictions made by the sub-

jects were not mediated by some dispositional construct that might have

TABLE 15
Correlations of Intentionality with Recall Scores and Polarized Prediction and Dispositional
Ratings Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Behavioral Sequence
Behavioral Sequences

Cognitive Level

NNN

Neutral

NNP

PNN

.471 **
.256
.140

.184
.338*
.076

.261
.067
.070

.092
.295
.195

.293
-.038
-.204

.325*
.065
.070

.207
.175
.050

.360*
-.466**
-.165

-.186
-.156
.226

-.154
.301
.147

.185
-.056
.112

.277
.185
.271

.028
-.057
-.124

.305
.315
-.464**

.132
-.232
-.443**

PPP

PPN

.263
.259
.418*

.215
.226
.154

.345*
.251
-.163

.127
.254
-.160

NPP

Dispositional with
Intentionality Ratings:
preoperational
concrete
formal

.187
.661***
.478**

Prediction with
Intentionality Ratings:
preoperational
concrete
formal
Recall with
Intentionality Ratings:
preoperational
concrete
formal

.009
.000
-.191

Note.

Prediction and dispositional ratings were adjusted so that extreme ratings were assigned lower
scores than the less extreme ratings~
* .E. <.05
**.E. <.01
***.E. <.001

(X)

0
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necessitated the consideration of intentions, but were based primarily
on a direct extrapolation from past behaviors.

Differential abilities

of cognitive levels to examine the information may still have influenced
these judgments, but the intention underlying the behaviors may not have
been a salient consideration.
Further interaction effects for prediction ratings.

In addition

to the above analyses, an unequal n, two (sex of experimenter) by two
(sex of subject) by three (cognitive level of operation) analysis of
variance was performed to check for any interaction effects between
sex of the experimenter and sex of the subject across cognitive levels,
(see Table 16 and 17).

No main effects for sex of subject, sex of ex1

perimenter, or cognitive level were found.

The only significant inter-

action was between sex of experimenter and cognitive level.

Examining

Table 17 indicates that the male experimenter elicited increasingly
more evaluatively positive predictions across cognitive levels but the
female experimenter elicited fewer positive predictions across these
same levels.

These interactions are again difficult to interpret since

it is not known whether these trends resulted from the sex of the experimenter per se or some particular qualities of the experimenter
independent of sex.
Summary.

In summary, the processes of prediction appear to be

very similar to those involved in making dispositional ratings.

Older

subjects (i.e., concrete and formal) appear to be averaging information
before making their judgments, and preoperational children appear to be
considering the most salient component within the set of behaviors.
· :-IoHe·ve. :.' , perceived L. '..
judgments are made.

tions may not be a consideration when these

Rather, subjects appear to be examining the behav-
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TABLE 16
Unequal n Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Prediction Ratings

Source

MS

df

F

Sex of subject (A)

5.615

1

2.346

Sex of experimenter (B)

3.449

1

1.441

.958

2

AxB

5.642

1

2.357

Ax

c

2.183

2

.912

B

X

c

7.765

2

3.244*

A

X

B

.727

2

.304

2.394

576

Cognitive level

X

c

Error

*

£. <.05

.400-
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TABLE 17

Means and Standard Deviations for Prediction Ratings Broken-down
by Sex of Subject and Sex of Experimenter

Sex

n

mean

preoperational

8

2.089

1.116

concrete

3

1.810

1.601

formal

5

1.629

1.646

preoperational

5

1.943

1.494

concrete

4

1.893

1. 707

formal

5

2.029

1.581

6

2.024

1. 703

11

1.935

1. 727

9

1.698

1.633

9

1.175

1.238

10

1. 757

1. 723

9

1.841

1.370

standard deviation

Male subject
Male experimenter

Female experimenter

Female subject
Male experimenter
preoperational
concrete
formal
Female experimenter
preoperational
concrete
formal
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TABLE 18

Percentage of Responses for Cognitive Levels that Attribute
Responsibility to the Actor for Actions Resulting in both
Positive and Negative Consequences

Cognitive Level
Consequences
Preoperational

Concrete

Formal

percentage

62.2%

56.1%

44.9%

frequency

61

55

44

percentage

44.9%

44.9%

49.0%

frequency

44

44

Positive

Negative

48
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ioral information and choosing those behaviors that would be a logical
extension from the actor's past actions.
Perceived responsibility of actor for ambiguous actions
A statement was read to subjects that was ambiguous with respect
to both the identity of the actor and the actor's intentions in performing behaviors that had either positive or negative consequences.
This statement was read after the intentionality, dispositional, and
prediction scales had been completed.

Subjects were asked to decide

whether or not it was the actor in the previously described behavioral
sequence that performed the ambiguous action.
Responses to statements emphasizing positive consequences were
classified by cognitive level and type of response (i.e., "yes" or
"no").

A chi-square revealed that with higher levels of cognitive de-

velopment, there was less of a tendency to ascribe responsibility to
the actor for those positive actions,x 2 (2)
18).

= 6.116,

~ < .05, (see Table

That is, preoperational children tended to ascribe responsibility

to the actor more so than older subjects.

Further analyses were per-

formed for each . of the cognitive levels by breaking-down responses by
behavioral sequence and response type.

No significant trends were
2

found for any of the three cognitive levels (i.e., preoperational:X (6)

= 4.082,
~

>.10).

~ >.10;

concrete:x 2 (6) = 7.790, ~ >.10;

2

formal:.x (6)

=

.990,

In other words, when consequences are positive, the prior be-

haviors of the actor appear not to effect whether subjects rate the
actor as performing the action or not.

Apparently, both "good" and

"bad" actors are likely to engage in actions that have positive consequences, (see Figure 7).

Frequencies :Jf "yes" responses

br..-~

_i-down

by sequences for preoperational, concrete and formal subjects are
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presented in Table 19.
Responses to statements emphasizing negative consequences were also
broken-down by cognitive level and type of response (see Table 18).
trends were found across cognitive levels, X2 (2)

=

.438, ~ >.10.

No
These

responses were further ·broken-down by response type and behavioral se. quence for each of the cognitive levels.

Preoperational children again

failed to differentiate responses as a function of the behavioral sequence.

That is, the prior behavioral information about the actor did

not affect whether the child saw that actor as performing the ambiguous
action.

Both concrete and formal subjects, however, did respond in such

a way that their "yes" or "no" response and the behavioral sequence were
related (X 2 (6)

=

29.289, ~ <.001;

x2 (6) = 37.975,

~ <.001, respectively;

see Table 20).
The patterns of these yes-no responses seem to closely parallel
the dispositional and prediction ratings of the concrete and formal
subjects (see Figure 8).

That is, actors who were rated as "good" were

seen as not responsible for an action with negative consequences, whereas actors who were rated as "bad" were rated as responsible for the
actions.

The more polarized the dispositional and prediction ratings,

the greater the agreement among subjects on the responsibility of the
actor for the action.

The implication is that older subjects will use

behavioral information in assigning responsibility for an ambiguous
action when the consequences are negative, but not when positive.

This

may be reflective of an attributional bias of adults (Kelley, 1967).
That _is, "the worse the consequences of an accidental event, the greater is the tendency to assign responsibility to the person possibly _
responsible for it."

(Kelley, 1967, p. 223)

When consequences are
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TABLE 19
Percentage of Subjects who Attributed Responsibility to the Actor
for Actions Resulting in Positive Consequences
Cognitive Level

Sequence

Preoperational

Concrete

Formal

percentage

57.1

57.1

42.9

frequency

8

8

6

percentage

50.0

50.0

50.0

frequency

7

7

7

percentage

64.3

35.7

35.7

frequency

9

5

5

percentage

50.0

42.9

42.9

frequency

7

6

6

percentage

71.4

78.6

42.9

frequency

10

11

percentage

64.3

57.1

50.0

9

8

7

percentage

78.6

71.4

50.0

frequency

11

10

ppp

PPN

NPP

Neutral

NNP

6

PNN

f~equency

NNN

7
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TABLE 20
Percentage of Subjects who Attributed Responsibility to the Actor
for Actions Resulting in Negative Consequences

"

Sequence

Cognitive Level
Preoperational
Concrete

Formal

PPP
percentage

42.9

14.3

frequency

6

2

1

percentage

50.0

14.3

35.7

frequency

7

2

5

percentage

50.0

42.9

35.7

frequency

7

6

5

percentage

50.0

21.4

21.4

frequency

7

3

3

percentage

42.9

64.3

57.1

frequency

6

9

8

percentage

28.6

. 71.4

92.9

frequency

4

10

13

percentage

50.0

85.7

92.9

frequency

7

12

13

7.1

PPN

NPP

Neutral

NNP

PNN

NNN

.. ·-
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negative, responsibility is assigned or attributed on the basis of the
prior behavioral information.

The more negative the preceeding behaviors,

the greater the tendency to ascribe responsibility to the actor. 13
The preoperational child's inability to decenter from one isolated
dimension of a situation may force him or her to focus on only the consequences of an ambiguous action.

Thus, he or she fails to consider

prior behaviors of the actor even when subsequent actions are negative.
Preoperational children then appear to be responding in somewhat of
random fashion.

a

Of course, an alternative to this explanation might be

that the preoperational children have a difficult time remembering the
behavioral information, and consequently have no basis on which to assign
responsibility.

This is an important consideration and will be dis-

cussed later in the paper.
Summary.

In summary, concrete and formal subjects appear to assign

responsibility on the basis of the prior information when the consequences are negative, but not when positive.

This may result from a

tendency of adults to systematically assign responsibility more when
the consequences are negative than when positive.

These findings, how-

ever, only partially substantiate hypotheses VII and IX, which predicted
that all attributions of responsibility would be based on the preceeding
behavioral information.
Younger preoperational children, through limitations imposed by
their cognitive level of development or through inabilities to remember
the behavioral information, were found to respond randomly when consequences are either positive or negative.

Thus, hypotheses VII and X

remain unsupp9tter:l that attributin-nr of responsibility would be made
when positive( consequences were preceeded by positive behaviors.
',
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Perceived intentions of actor for ambiguous actions
Subsequent to the determination of whether the subject saw the actor
as performing the ambiguous act, the perceived intentions
that action were assessed.

und~rlying

That is, if subjects responded that the actor

performed the action, the subject was next asked the degree to which the
a·ctor "meant to" or ''did not mean to" perform that behavior.

A "forced-

choice" format produced a four-point scale that was assumed to·be of
equal interval.
From examination of the means presented in Tables 21 and 22, there
appears to be no differences in intentionality ratings as a function of
cognitive level, valence of consequences, or behavioral sequence .(see
also Figures 9 and 10).

These results, however, may not be that sur-

prising in light of the complexities of the task.

For example, the

series of measures given between the behavioral presentation and this
measurement of intentionality might have obscured the actual behavioral
information.

Further, even if aware of the behavioral information,

subjects might have been confused by the temporal separation between
behavioral stimuli and this measure.
That is, subjects may not have recognized the "legitimacy" of using
this information in making their assessments of intentionality.

There

is also the problem of subject selection, since subjects placed themselves into this sample on the basis of their response to the preceeding
question.

Only if they saw the actor as actually engaging in the am-

biguous action were they asked about the intentions behind these behaviors.

Thus, it is at least possible that a unique population existed

that was characterized by dispositions or orientations that influenced
the intentionality judgments.

TABLE 21
Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Based on Positive Consequences of Ambiguous
Actions Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequences
Behavioral Sequence
Cognitive Level
PPP

PPN

NPP

Neutral

NNP

PNN

NNN

mean

1. 750

2.000

2.000

1. 714

2.700

2.333

2.091

s tandard deviation

1.035

1.414

1.323

1.113

1.337

1.323

1.375

8

7

9

7

10

9

11

mean

2.250

2.143

3.200

2.667

2.545

2.250

2.600

3tandard deviation

1.389

1.345

1.304

1.506

1.368

1.282

1.265

8

7

5

6

11

8

10

mean

1.667

1.714

1.600

1.500

2.167

1.857

2.143

standard deviation

1.506

1.254

.894

1.225

1.329

1.215

1.345

6

7

5

6

6

7

7

Preoperational

n
Concrete

n
Formal

n

\0
VJ

TABLE 22
Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Based on Negative Consequences of Ambiguous
Actions Broken-down

~

Cognitive Level and Sequence
Behavioral Sequence

Cognitive Level
PPP

PPN

NPP

Neutral

NNP

PPN

NNN

mean

2.667

2. 714

2.571

2.429

2.833

1. 750

2.143

standard deviation

1. 366

.951

1. 272

1.272

1.472

.957

1. 215

6

7

7

7

6

4

7

2.500

2.500

2.833

2.333

2.556

2.000

1.833

.707

.707

.753

.577

.762

1.054

1.030

2

2

6

3

9

10

12

mean

4.000

2.600

3.200

3.333

2.125

2.462

2.385

standard .deviation

0.0

1.140

.837

1.155

1.246

1.266

1. 325

5

5

3

8

13

13

Preoperational

n
Concrete
mean
standard deviation
n
Formal

n

1

\0
.p.
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It is also interesting to note that no differences were found between positive and negative sequences.

It is possible that once respon-

sibility for a negative or positive action is assigned, the intentions
underlying that action are not an important consideration.

However,

another possibility might be that subjects were more concerned with who
performed the action and failed to focus on whether the consequences
were negative or positive.

Thus, when subjects were assessing inten-

tionality, the consequences were not a salient factor.
Differences between cognitive levels of operation .also were not
found.

In light of the earlier evidence that older subjects appear

most able to discern intentions, this may further indicate that subjects did not recognize the importance of using the prior behavioral
information in assessing intentions.

That is, older concrete and for-

mal subjects apparently have the ability to discern intentions after
the definite behavioral information is presented, but whether they use
,,
these ''intentions" and behaviors in interpretation of ambiguous actions
is still questionable.
Summary.

In summary, a number of reasons may account for the lack

of differences in intentionality ratings.

It should not be concluded

that subjects cannot use behavioral information in assessing intentions
underlying ambiguous actions.

Rather, a new methodological approach

must be used before these questions can be answered.
Recall of behavioral information by subjects
Immediately after the presentation of measures pertaining to the
ambiguous actions, subjects were asked to recall the behavioral information which was initially presented.

This

V.7 a

S

to determine

whett:: ~

responses mightbe attributed to differential abilities to remember the
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information presented.

Each positive or negative behavior correctly re-

called received a score of "1".

That is, each subject had two recall

scores, a positive and a negative.

For example, in PPP sequences, three

positive behaviors recalled would receive a score of "3" in the positive
category and a "O" in the negative category.

Since only positive be-

havior were presented in this sequence, it· would have been impossible
for the subject to score more than "0" in the negative category or more
than "3" in the positive.

Of course, the subject might recall less

than all three of the behaviors in this sequence, in which-case the
score in the positive category would reflect the number correctly recalled. l4
A three (subject's level of cognitive development) by six (behavioral sequence) by two (positive and negative categories of behavioral
information) analysis of variance with subjects repeated across the
last two factors was used to analyze the data (see Table 23).
A main effect was found for the cognitive level of operation, F
(2, 81)

= 34.587, E <.001.

Differences resulted from preoperational

children having significantly greater difficulty recalling the behavioral information than concrete and formal subjects (r (82)

= 8.14, E

No differences were found between concrete and formal subjects,
1.36,

~

>.10.

~

<.001).
(54)

=

This finding is supportive of other studies (e.g., Hagen,

Meacham, & Mesibov, 1970) which have found that younger children do have
more difficulty remembering information than older subjects.

Addition-

ally, this finding may account for the less polarized ratings of the
preoperational children as contrasted with the concrete and formal
-~

oups.

That is, the inability to remember the behaviors of the actor

may result in less confident dispositional and prediction judgments-
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TABLE 23
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Behaviors Recalled

Source
Cognitive level (A)

MS

df

F

27.656

2

.800

81

Behavioral sequence (B)

.713

5

1. 979

Ax B

.475

10

1. 317

.360

405

1.286

1

4.358**

.574

2

1.947

.295

81

29.474

5

81.236***

2.627

10

7.240

• 363

405

Error (between)

Error (within)
Valence (C)
Ax C
Error (within)
B

X

c

A

X

B

X

C

Error (within)

*

p <.001

**

p <.05

*** p <.0001

34.587*
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which may be reflected in less polarization of ratings.

Another explan-

ation for the lower recall scores of the younger subjects is a failure
to attend to the information.
the behavioral

information~

Both of the above

Subjects may not have been listening to

and as a result were unable to verbalize it.

interpretations~

with caution for a number of reasons.

however, should be approached
As an example, the recall measure

was given as the last measure, and accordingly was mediated by a variety
of other questions and scales.

An inability to remember the information

at the end of the task does not mean he or she was unaware of and did
not use the behavioral information in preceding measures.

That is, the

child may have remembered the information for his initial responses, but
forgot the behaviors as the time elapsed.

Further, it might be argued

that awareness or recall of the exact information is not necessary in
making dispositional and prediction ratings.

·The "valence" of that

information (i.e., either positive or negative) may be more important
than the specific behaviors.

It is pos_sible that once the "valence"

of the behaviors was ascertained, subjects simply used that information
and "forgot" the specific actions.
ioral information is no
made.

It is also possible that the behav-

longer important once an attribution has been

That is, once a subject has decided whether the actor is "good"

or "bad," it may be unnecessary to remember "why" he or she is ''good"
or "bad."

As support for this, Anderson and Hubert ' (1963) obtained

evidence for separate memory systems for the impression itself and for ·
the words.

They suggested that as each word was received, its meaning

was extracted and integrated into the current impression.
no ·Jc,:;

The word was

r necessary and was stored elsewhere.

Significant differences were found between the positive and negative
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information recalled.

That is, positive information tended to be re-

called more frequently than negative behaviors,
< .05.

!

(1, 81)

= 4.358,

~

This may indicate that positive and negative information may

differ on some other dimension than "valence."

It should be noted that

the interaction between cognitive level and valence of information was
not significant.

This suggests that the positivity or negativity of the

information did not differentially affect the ratings made by the various cognitive levels.

However, the interaction between valence of

behavioral information and behavioral sequence was significant, F (5,
405)

= 81.236,

~

<.0001.

This was expected, of course, because of the

consistently positive and negative sequences.

If only positive infor-

mation is presented, for example, it would be impossible for a subject
to score anything but a "O" in the positive recall category.
Summary.

In summary, the preoperational child's inability to re-

call behavioral information may account for their less polarized prediction and dispositional ratings as contrasted with older subjects.
However, other factors intrinsic to the experimental procedure may similarly account for the lower recall scores without assuming the children
were not using that information when making their ratings.

In addition,

it cannot be assumed that children were not paying attention to the
information since factors other than the specific behavioral information
may mediate the . attribution process.

CONCLUSIONS
Although many of the specific hypotheses in this study were not
supported, results did indicate certain trends in the development of
the ability to make dispositional and responsibility attributions.

Be-

fore these trends are reviewed, however, certain assumptions and limitations of the study will be discussed.
Assumptions and limitations
One of the primary assumptions was that the verbal responses of the
subjects would be accurate reflections of the actual cognitive processes
of the subjects.

That is, the ability to verbally communicate one's

thoughts may influence one's response capability.
be a potential

confou~d

Of course, this may

in much of psychological research, but it be-

comes a particularly salient consideration when dealing.with children.
The present study attempted to limit the dependence on the child's
ability to verbally communicate his or her thoughts by using pictoral
and verbal stimuli.

The child was required to respond by repeating the

verbal expression which he or she deemed most appropriate, or by pointing to that picture most reflective of his or her thoughts.

Further,

when a verbal response was required the choices were presented by a
paired comparison method that "forced" the child to pick between only
two items at one time.

Certainly these methodological approaches did

not guarantee that responses were a direct reflection of cognitive processes, but they did limit the confounds with the child's ability to
verbally communicate information.
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Perhaps a more critical assumption was that the "meaning" of the
categories comprising each of the dependent measures would be the same
across all levels of cognitive development.

For example, it was assumed

that "very, very . good" would carry the same evaluative connotation for
all subjects.

The validity of this assumption is an important consider-

ation, since the child's ability to use interval data has not been fully
documented.

Thus, there is the possibility that children do not readily

differentiate between such categories as "very, very good" and "good"
in the same way that adults do.
In this study, varying degrees of "goodness" and "badness" were
made salient through the dimension of size, in addition to requiring
all subjects to label the picture most reflective of their judgments.
Again this does not guarantee that for all subjects the connotative
meaning was the same.

However, by using pictoral stimuli it does make

salient the interval nature of the categories.

That is, both pictoral

and verbal stimuli should mutually aid in highlighting the variations
in the evaluative meaning of the stimuli.
A further assumption was that the behavioral information presented
would carry the same degree of evaluative "goodness" or "badness" for
all subjects.

Although the choice of behaviors used was dependent on

.previous evaluative ratings that were lowest in standard deviations for
all ages,

thi~

may still have been a problem.

That is, in rating the

behaviors, subjects may still have had to first determine whether the
"action" was intentional or not befor.e a judgment could be made. -The
problem is · that this was what the present study had hoped to determine;
whether intentions were a factor in attributional processes.

It then

only becomes an -assumption that the behaviors presented were perceived
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as similar in evaluative meaning across all subjects.
Certain limitations of this study should also be clarified before
any further interpretation of results is attempted.

For example, the

"actor" that enacted the behaviors and the "entities" to which these
behaviors were directed were all males.

Male stimuli were used because

the author felt that behaviors that were clearly evaluatively negative
were more highly associated with males (e.g., hitting) than females.
Further, it was decided that the "entities" to which the actions were
directed should be similarly sexed to avoid differentia.! evaluative
judgments of behaviors directed toward females as opposed to males.
Theoretically, the interpretation of the results should then be limited
to male actors behaving toward male entities.

However, since this study

was concerned with how children can process behavioral information in
making attributions, the question of sex is of no immediate relevance.
Clearly, many factors may influence the subject's judgments, the sex of
the "actors" being only one.

This, of course, does not mean that these

factors are not of interest and should not be examined in subsequent
investigations, but merely that the "sex of actor and entity" are not
active concerns of this study.
A further limitation of this study was that the behaviors appeared
to characterize a very young actor.

Although the specific age of the _

"actor" was not specified, many subjects gave verbal indications that
they perceived him as a "little boy."

Unfortunately, this was an

unavoidable product of the design of the study.

That is, in choosing

behaviors that were clearly "meaningful" to all ages and yet were
. either

evaluati~;e ly

selected.

pc:s itive or negu="' -

.! ,

simple behaviors had to be

Behaviors that ate "simple," yet either "positive" or "nega-
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tive'' are frequently physical actions.
to be indicative of a young actor.

Simple physical actions appear

The age of the actor per se would

not be a problem, if impressions were based solely on the information
presented.

However, impressions are influenced by the other knowledge

or "constructs" one brings to the situation.

That is, various aged

observers may have different conceptions of.what "little boys" are like
and the way that they behave.

This may have an impact on the impress-

ion formation process, confounding the interpretations made of the behavioral manipulations.
Another limitation of this study was with the dependent measures.
To insure simplicity of presentation and understanding, a "paired comparison" was used for the intentionality scales.

This limited the

number of "categories" on the scale to four, in addition to "forcing"
the child to decide whether the actor performed the action..

The lack

of variation within the scale may not have been sensitive enough to
"pick-up" the degrees of cognitive differentiation actually being made
by the subject.

Thus, the scales may only be picking tip the "crudest"

of differences between behavioral stimuli.

In addition, the lack of a

mid-point between the categories of "meant to" and "didnot mean to" may
have eliminated a legitimate category.

That is, subjects may not have

actually known whether the actor "meant to" or "didnot mean to" perform
the actions.

Of course, "forcing" the subject to look for the inten-

tions was the purpose of this experiment, but it may not accurately reflect cognitive operations occurring under more natural circumstances.
Further, this procedure eliminated the possibility of subjects "playing
it safe" by choosing the most neutral category.

Pilot observations

had indicated that young children were apt to utilize the neutral ratings
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unless "forced" to make an actual decision about the intentionality of
the actor •
.It might also be questioned whether the intentionality scale is
really a measurement of intentions, and, further, whether the scale is
really of an interval nature.

For example, the concept of "meaning to"

may not be an accurate reflection of perceived intentions.

In addition,

the interval between such categories as ''really meant to" and "sort of
meant to" may not be the same as between "sort of meant to" and "sort of
did not mean to."

If dealing solely with adults, using . numerically

bipolar scales weighted at the ends by "very intentional" and "very unintentional" may have been a more desirable approach.

However, when

questioning children, the usefulness of this procedure is marginal.

It

was decided that applying labels to each point on the scale would more
meaningfully differentiate the degrees of intentionality than mere
points on the scale.

Further, it was felt that the use of terminology

with which the child was familiar would also communicate more "meaning"
to the child.

It is then only an assumption that the scales are of an

interval nature and that the terminology used does reflect varying degrees of perceived intentionality.
Of course, the interval nature and construct validity of the dispositional measure might also be questioned.

This is because, as with

the intentionality measures, labels were applied.to each point on the
dispositional scale.

However, the additional use of pictoral stimuli

to depict the points may have produced an additional confound not present with the intentionality scale.

That is, the pictures may have

portrayed affective coF:)one nt ::: not necessar::.::_ characteristic of "good"
and ''bad" dispositions.

For example, the "good boy" Jllight also be
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labeled as "happy" thereby confusing the child in making his ratings.
To minimize this confound, subjects were required to apply the dispositional label to that picture that portrayed their judgment.

This

would guarantee that all subjects had, at least, verbalized the dispositional concept.

In addition, degrees of good and bad respectively

portrayed the same "good boy" and "bad boy" caricatures;
degrees only being reflected in the gradient of size.

variations in

In other words,

the same affective stimuli was constant across the degrees of "goodness" and "badness," thus minimizing the possibility that a given portrayal might affect ratings differentially.
A further limitation is found with the modified MBPT.

The large

number of sequences to which subjects were asked to respond necessitated
that the original ten-item MBPT be shortened to four items.

As with

the other dependent measures, this may not have been sensitive enough
to pick up variations in actual cognitive processes.

Further, the

forced-choice format of the scale did not allow subjects a neutral or
"I don't know" alternative.

Thus, the actual choice made may not be

reflective of those cognitive processes occurring in more typical
settings.
The development of the ability to assess behavioral intentions
Following Kelley's (1967) theory, a prerequisite to making dispositional attributions is the judging of the observed behaviors as "intentional."

Accidental behaviors or actions that are coerced are viewed

as unintentional;
dispositions.

and thus are not reflective of the actor's personal

Intentionality is determined by examining the behaviors

and the situational circumstances.

If no situational information is

given, an observer : must rely on the actor's behaviors and his own ex-
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periences and knowledge to determine both the intentions and dispositions of the actor.

Two components of this behavioral information that

may have an impact on these attributional processes are the consistency
and evaluative polarity of the information.
At the preoperational level of cognitive development, children are
operating from an egocentric position.

That is, these children have

yet to realize that their thoughts, wants and feelings are different
from those of other peoples.

Accordingly, preoperational children ·

have difficulty understanding the reasons why another .c h_i ld is behaving
in a given way.

Specifically, it was hypothesized that preoperational

children would have more difficulty than older subjects making attributions of intentionality based on the behavioral information.

Re-

sults supported this hypothesis that preoperational children did rate
the actor's behaviors across sequences as less intentional (i.e.,
"meaning to") than concrete and formal subjects.

This lower polariza-

tion resulted from the younger subjects distributing responses somewhat
equally across all response categories.

This would indicate that the

(

preoperational children may have had difficulty consistently attributing
any intentionality to behaviors.
Another finding was that all subjects tended to rate "consistent"
sequences (both positive and negative) as indicative of a higher degree
of intentionality than "inconsistent" sequences.

This is not particu-

larly surprising for the concrete and formal subjects, who having
mastered the concept of invariance, have both learned to expect consistencies in behaviors across modalities.

That is, unless the actor's

behaviors are seen as unir.tentic:1 a l, older subjPr+-s will expect a certain degree of invariance in those behaviors.

It might then be expected
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that older subjects might maintain "invariance" by labeling inconsistent behaviors as less reflective of intentions than consistent behaviors.
A closer examination of the preoperational's intentionality ratings
was made to check for differential judgments of consistently positive
and consistently negative information.

Analyses revealed that it was

the consistently positive behaviors that were rated intentional and
not the consistently negative sequences (which were rated similar to
the inconsistent behaviors).

This supports Costanzo's et al. (1974)

conclusion that preoperational children attribute intentions behind
positive actions more readily than behind negative behaviors.
The implication of this is that preoperational children may more
readily make dispositional attributions when the behavioral information
is positive.

That is, dispositional ratings should be more polarized

when the behavioral information is positive as opposed to negative.
The figures of the dispositional and prediction ratings do indicate
that for preoperational children, positive ratings are more polarized
than negative ratings as contrasted with the comparisons in the judgments of concrete and formal subjects.

That intentions are differen-

tially related to dispositional ratings for consistently positive and
negative information across cognitive levels of operations is also reflected in correlational differences.

Correlations between degree of

intentionality and polarity of the dispositional judgments were tested
for significant differences between preoperational and grouped concrete
and formal subjects.

No differences were found between groups when the

behavioral information was consistently positive.

However, when the

presented information was consistently negative, the grouped concrete
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and formal subjects saw intentionality and polarity of dispositional
ratings as significantly more related than the ratings of the preoperational subjects.

This indicates that perceived intentions are related

to the polarization of dispositional judgments.

Further, it indicates

that preoperational children more readily attribute intentions behind
consistently positive information, resulting in more positive polarized
dispositional attributio:ns.
Although the correlations between dispositional ratings and the MBPT
were significantly related for all subjects, it is interesting to note
the somewhat inexplicable correlations between intentionality and polarization of prediction ratings.

This may indicate that the two functions

of any dispositional attribution (i.e., explanation and prediction) are
based on different information.

That is, while the intentions of an

actor were useful in explaining behaviors (i.e., making a dispositional
attribution), the actual prediction of future behaviors may be based
more on the past behaviors per se without real consideration of the
underlying intentions.

More specifically, subjects will take account

of the intentions of an actor before rating him as a "good" or "bad"
boy;

but, how that boy is predicted to behave in the future is more

related to how he has behaved in the past.

Of course, the dispositional

measure and the MBPT are correlated because both scales are ultimately
based on the behavioral information.

The difference may only be that

to make a dispositional attribution, the mediating factor of intentions
must be considered, while to make a prediction only the past actions
may be necessary.

However, this is not to imply that the prediction

of future behaviors may never necessitate tl-.e assessment of

inte11 ~~ Jns.

In the present study, the behavioral information presented and the
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behaviors portrayed in the MBPT were of the same simplistic nature.
Thus, it may not have been necessary for subjects to consider the intentionality of the actions before making a prediction.

The subjects

may merely have had to choose those behaviors that most paralleled the
behavioral information presented.

In more complex prediction tasks,

it may be necessary for the subject to examine the intentions before
he can make a prediction confidently.
There does appear to be a trend toward averaging of the behavioral
information.

That is; increasing the amount of positive · information

results in increasingly lower ratings.

This is not surprising for the

concrete and formal subjects who have mastered the concept of invariance.

To achieve a "meaningful" disposition, they must consider the

"set" of behavioral information and the degree to which it reflects the
actor's intentions.
reflective of

Since all behaviors appear t .o be at least somewhat

intentionality~

information is weighted in a manner that

dispositional attributions can be made that are reflective of all the
behaviors within the set.

For preoperational children, there appears

to be a leveling-off effect for the PPP and NNN sequences..

That is,

preoperational children are rating PPP and PPN or NPP behavioral sequences as somewhat similar and also NNN and NNP and PNN sequences as
similar.

Clearly, a simple averaging model fails to completely explain

these ratings patterns.
These patterns do, however, make intuitive sense if we assume that
the preoperational children were guided by the principle of "absolute
invariance" (Livesley & Bromley, p. 212).

That is, the child's ego-

cc,, crism and failure at mastering the invariance principle, leads him
or her to regard others as either absolutely good or bad.

The child
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apparently observes the entire "set," but does not attempt to make
"sense" of any inconsistent information by weighting it in the final
impression.

Not expecting the behaviors of others to be constant,

judgments are simply based on that information which is most salient
within the set.

Apparently, the less consistent piece of information

within inconsistent sets is simply ignored.

Of course, these results

are in contrast to the hypothesis that the most temporally recent piece
of information would be most salient to preoperational children.

-

This,

however, could result from children seeing the entire set as a single
event and not mutually independent sequential events.

It is possible

that if there were more of a temporal lag between behaviors the most
recent piece of information within the set would have been salient.
There was a significant tendency to rate PPP information as indicative of more positive dispositions than the PPN and NPP sequences.
This is contradictory to what might be predicted if children were
guided solely by the "absolute invariance" principle.

This contrast

may result from the child's inability to assign intentions to the consistently- positive actions.

That is, the preoperational child may be

able to overcome the more salient aspects of the information to take
account of intentions before judgments are made.

The more intentional

an action is perceived, the more reflective it is of a disposition.

In

situations where the negative information is salient (i.e., NNN, NNP,
and PNN sequences), the child does not attribute intentionality to the
actions of the actor.

Thus, all ratings are absolutely based on the

negatively salient behaviors.

The principle of absolute invariance is

operative.
Examining the MBPT ratings, it appears that preoperational chil-
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dren are not differentiating between the PPP and the PPN and NPP behaviors, as contrasted with the dispositional measure.

Again this may

result from the subjects in this study not considering intentions before making behavioral predictions.

That is, the behavioral information

by itself seems to be sufficient in making a behavioral prediction.
Thus, for the MBPT ratings, the most salient features ·of the information
appear to be guiding the preoperational children's judgments, while
older subjects appear to be taking an "averaging" approach.
In summary, the ability to discern intention helps divorce the
child from the absoluteness of his perspective.

This facilitates exam-

ination of the invariances found within the set of behaviors.

Dispo-

sitional judgments will then be based on the consistencies or inconsistencies found within that set of information.
The development of the ability to assign responsibility on the basis of
prior behavioral information
Just as subjects can attribute dispositions and make predictions on
the basis of behavioral information, they can, apparently, assign responsibility for ambiguous actions.

The use of behavioral information

is most obvious for concrete and formal subjects when the consequences
of the ambiguous actions are negative.

That is, when behaviors result

in physical damages to other persons or property a bias toward attributing those consequences to a personal causation is evident.

Respon-

sibility is then assigned on the basis of prior behavioral information.
The principle of invariance is operative.

A person who has performed

negative actions in the past is probably responsible for present nega. tiveconsE: .:t ~. 1ces;

while a person who does "good" things is unlikely

to perform actions which result in consequences that are negative.

The
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younger preoperational children, not having mastered the concept of
invariance, have no basis on which to assign responsibility.

That is,

not seeing the prior behavioral information as reflective of the actor's
intentions, the child has no reason to think that "good" or ''bad" boys
will differentially be responsible for the negative consequences stemming
from ambiguous actions.
When the consequences of an ambiguous action are positive, a somewhat different pattern prevails.

That is, there appears to be no sys-

tematic tendency to assign responsibility on the basis of .the prior
behavioral information.

This may reflect the desire of subjects to

"give the benefit of the doubt" to all actors, either good or bad;
a realization that even bad boys are not bad all of the time.

or

This

interpretation may be particularly applicable since actors appeared to
be characterized as very young.

Specifically, if the actors were

labeled as "adults" this "bias" of giving the "benefit of the doubt"
to even the actors characterized by negative behaviors might not be
present.

Subjects might then be "forced" to examine the behavioral in-

formation and assign responsibility on the basis of what seems to be
"invariant" characteristics of the actor.

The preoperational child's

inability to assign intentions to the behavioral information may then
hinder him or her in attributing responsibility.
The implications of this may then be that negative consequences
"force" subjects to search for "invariant" properties of actors which
might "explain" the actions.

Positive consequences do not produce a

"bias" toward attributions of personal causation;

thus, personal biases

or previously formulated "personal constructs" are salient.

The de-

velopment of the principle of invariance in subjects is an important
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factor if attributions of responsibility are to be made solely on the
information given, but is unnecessary if other sources of information are
influential.

Thus, subjects may look at behavioral information and

assign responsibility for positive consequences as a result of "feeling
sorry for" or because of a belief that there is "no such thing as a
really bad boy."

However, the assignment of responsibility for negative

consequences is a more serious matter and must be mediated by perceptions of intentionality underlying the prior behavioral information.
The inability to attribute intentions to actions results in a failure
to examine the invariances found within those behaviors.

Accordingly,

responsibility can not be assigned on the basis of consistencies with
prior behavioral information.
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FOOTNOTES
lrn this experiment, children may have focused more on the consequences of a transgression than on the intentions because the actor's
behaviors were more public.

That is, to take account of the less salient

_intentions of the actor may have necessitated that the child decenter
from his egocentric perspective.
2There is an exception to this general rule.

That is, a person _may

make a dispositional attribution based on other than intended behaviors.
For example, a person who is consistently clumsy may be labeled as a
"bad boy," if his clumsiness results in material or personal damages.
The present study will attempt to avoid this possible confound by using
only "willful behaviors."

That _is, only behaviors that are clearly

reflective of intentionality will be used as stimuli.
3Explanations of "ambiguous behaviors" are here referring to two
judgments.
action.

The first is whether an actor did or did not perform a given

The second, assuming the actor did perform the action, is one

of intentionality.

That is, it may subsequently be determined whether

the actor meant to perform the action.
4rt should be noted that the "ideal" way to check for primacy and
recency effects would be to include sets where the inconsistent behavior
was introduced between the two consistent behaviors (i.e., PNP; NPN).
However, since these additional sets would produce an unmanageable number

o~

experimental conditions, they were excluded from the present study.

It would be expected that dispositional attributions based on these new
variations in the order of behavioral information would be no different
than attributions based on sets similar in degree of evaluative positivity
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or negativity.

However, later studies might investigate how variations

in the ordering of information affect judgments of confidence in one's
dispositional attributions.
SThe preoperational child's inability to decenter dictates that only
one dimension of a situation is examined at one time.

When information

is inconsistent, the most · temporally recent behavior should be salient
to the child and guide subsequent responses.

Accordingly, preoperation-

al children should make more positively and negatively polarized judgments than older children when sets are inconsistent.

That is, older

children will consider all behaviors within the set of actions integrating inconsistent behaviors, while preoperational children may not
attempt to integrate inconsistent actions.
6rnteraction effects are then expected between the polarity of the
most temporally recent .piece of behavioral information and the consequences of the subsequent action.

Temporally recent positive behaviors

may facilitate subsequent attributions of responsibility and intentionality when consequences are positive but not negative.

Temporally recent

negative behaviors may hinder attributions based on the positive or
negative consequences.
7Although the set of three neutral behaviors is evaluatively consistent, unless otherwise stated, "consistent sets" will refer exclusively to either consistently positive or consistently negative sets.
8This prediction might have been based on a simple averaging model
(Anderson, 1965).

However, generalizations based on this· model must be

made carefully since Anderson maintains that the final judgment be on
the same dimension on which the preceding information or stimuli was rated.
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Although it might be argued that "good" and "bad" dispositional judgments
lie along the same dimension on which the preceding individual behaviors
were judged, this is . still an assumption since dispositional judgments
may not be a unidimensional construct.
9rt should be noted that no tests were given to differentiate subjects operating at concrete and formal levels.

It was expected that no

differential trends in attributions of dispositions or intentions would
be found for these two groups.

-

The formal group was included to extend

the generalizability of any findings and as a precaution to determine
whether any differences in attribution processes did occur at this level
as contrasted with the earlier concrete level.
lOrt should be noted that all actors were given male names, since
the behaviors were more stereotypically male.
llThe alternating of the disposition and prediction scales was the
only variation in the order of presentation of the dependent measures.
These scales were alternated since parallel responses to them were expected.

The preceding scale of intentionality, which was considered to

-be of primary importance in this study, was not alternated with any other
measure.
12As was expected, there was no statistical difference between intentionality ratings of concrete subjects and those of formal subjects.
Examining differences in ratings of specific sequences, however, reveals
some variations which may be statistically different.

Since the primary

focus of this study was examination of preoperational children as - con- .
trasted with older subjects, any differences in ratings between concrete
and formal subjects will not be

discus ~e d

in this paper.

122
13rhere may be an alternative explanation to why older subjects
assign responsibility on the basis of preceding behaviors when consequences are negative but not positive.

That is, negative consequences

may be seen as more clearly negative thart positive consequences are positive.

This also demonstrates the difficulty in interpreting differences

between positive and negative'sequences.

There may be qualitative diff-

erences between these sequences in addition to the difference in degree
of evaluative positivity or negativity.
l4Recall of positive and negative items were scored separately
because it was felt that the positivity or negativity of the items might
differentially influence recall abilities.
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Examples of Consistently and Inconsistently
either Positive or Negative Behavioral Sets
Consistently positive behaviors:
John gave Gary a present.
John shared his toys with Joe.
John gave Ken a ride on his bicycle.
Inconsistently positive behaviors followed by a negative behavior:
John hugged Tim.
John gave a cookie to Fred.
John hit Ken's arm.
Consistently negative behaviors:
John called Paul a bad name.
John bit Brian's arm.
John grabbed Jim's toys.
Inconsistently negative behaviors followed by a positive behavior:
John tore Fred's picture.
John threw dirt at Bob.
John helped Brian clean-up his room.

Note: Each sequence will be followed by an ambiguous behavior that
results in either positive or negative consequences (see examples in
Appendix D).
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Set I. "very' ve ry good"
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Set I. "good"
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Set I. "a little bit good"
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Set II. " veey, · yery bad"
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Instructions for Behavioral Prediction Ratings
After the dispositional ratings had been obtained (see Appendix B),
the child was questioned to determine whether he could "predict" those
behaviors that the actor might perform in the future.
The scale consists of four paired pictures representing either a
good or bad behavior.

The pairs were presented individually and the

child was asked to point to the picture in that pair that most likely
characterized the actor's future behaviors.
was asked "Which boy do you think John is?".

\

Specifically, the child

...
l
1

r

0

.·

.

APPENDIX D

137
Ambiguous Behaviors resulting in .
either Positive or Negative Consequences
Positive consequences:
a)

and some friends were in somebody's house.

Someone made a

loud noise scaring away a robber.
b)

and some friends were outside.

Someone kicked a ball on the

roof, knocking down a hammer that had been lost there.
c)

and some friends were outside.

Someone threw a baseball bat

on the ground scaring away a poisonous snake.
d)

Someone ran into somebody

and some friends were outside.

else, knocking that person out of the way of a speeding car.
e)

Someone kicked a ball, scar-

and some friends were outside.

ing away a dog that was about to attack.
f)

and some friends were in somebody's house.

Someone threw a

ball at a shelf, knocking down a toy that had been out of reach.
g)

and some friends were outside.

Someone hit a tree knocking

down a kite that had been caught there.
Negative consequences:
a)

and some friends were inside.

Someone yelled very loudly

awakening the neighbors.
b)

and some friends were outside.

Someone threw the baseball

bat, hitting another person.
c)

and some friends were outside.

Someone ran into someone else

knocking that person to the ground.
d)

and some friends were outside.
landing it on the roof out of reach.

Someone kicked the ball
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e)

and some friends were outside.

Someone ran through the

•

flowerbed, breaking some flowers.
f)

and some friends were inside.

Someone ran into the table

breaking some dishes on the floor.
g)

and some friends were outside.
breaking a window.

Someone threw a baseball,

/
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Positive, Negative, and Neutral Behaviqrs
Positive behaviors:
a) John gave a cookie to Fred
b) John shared his lunch with Greg
c) John helped Bob pick up his toys
d) John gave Gary a present
e) John gave Ken a ride on his bicycle
f) John invited Fred over to his house to play

g) John shared his toys with Joe
h) John helped JiD!._ draw a picture
i) John helped Brian clean up his room
Negative behaviors:
a) John tore Fred's picture
b) John bit Brian's arm
c) John grabbed Jim's toys
d) John called Paul a bad name
e) John poured water on Ken
f) John pulled Joe's hair

g) John hit Tim's arm
h) John threw dirt at Bob
i) John kicked Gary in the leg
Neutral behaviors:
a) John ran past Bob
b) John spoke to Ken
c) John stood in line with Paul
d) John lifted Tim's chair
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e) John watched Gary play
f) John looked at Joe's picture

Note.

Names were assigned randomly across all sequences.

'
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Scoring Sheet
A. Do you think

Subject

---

meant to:

u·- - -

Sex of subject

really meant to

Sex of experimenter

sort of meant to

Age of subject

didn't mean to:

Piagetian tasks:

really didn't mean to

a) passed __ b) passed __ -

sort of didn't mean to

not passed __ not passed

/

Items "B" and "C" reversed
B. Is

c.

a "good" or "bad" boy?

if good: "very, very good"

i f bad: "very, very bad"

"good"

"bad"

"a little bit good"

"a little bit bad"

Behavior Prediction test:

D. Do you think _ __
if yes: Do you think

• • • • . • : yes ·_; no

---

meant to:
really meant to
sort of meant to

-

didn't mean to:
really didn't mean to
sort of didn't mean to
E. Now see if you can remember the three things that
1)

2)
3)

did:
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Parental Permission Form

TO:

PARENTS OF 1st & 4th GRADE STUDENTS

FROM:

DOROTHY C. BLACK
ACTING DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH & SPECIAL PROJECTS

During the week of December 8-12, 60 children in first and fourth
grades will be participating in a research project investigating ways
in which children view behavior. The study is under the direction of .
a graduate student at Loyola University, Department of Psychology.
The study will require each child torespond to picture and story
material individually during a 15-20 minute period.
·
If you are willing for your child to cooperate in this research project,
please sign this slip and return it to school.

(Parents' Signature)
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